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Peacekeeping from 
a Global-human Security Perspective
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Abstract
This thesis is a two part study of security and peacekeeping. The end of the 
Cold War, dissolution of the Soviet Union and globalization have set the stage 
for a radical transformation of the nature and perception of the term security. 
Recent events, including the Gulf War, the exposed racism and violence of 
peacekeepers in Somalia, the attack on Mohammed Aideed in Somalia, and 
NATO bombings in the former Yugoslavia, have fostered a new and tarnished 
perception of peacekeeping. This at a time when more UN peacekeeping 
missions have been established in the past five years than in its first 35 years. 
Firstly, it is my contention and premise that a paradigm shift is occurring in terms 
of global security issues. An objective and subjective transformation of a state- 
centric security system {which I call the traditional security paradigm) to a global 
and people centered security system (which I call the global-human security 
paradigm) is underway. And secondly, to best understand and utilize generic 
‘peacekeeping’ (which includes peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy, 
enforcement, peacemaking and peacebuilding) it must be evaluated from the 
perspective of the global-human security paradigm and in particular from an 
international critical theory which is based on Gramscian critical theory. 
International critical theory clearly outlines whose security and what security is to 
be protected. Thus criteria for evaluating peacekeeping are established. The 
thesis concludes with a sweeping overview of the global policy implications 
needed for a people-centred security as derived from the study.
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Who brought the bomb wrapped up in business cards 
and stained w ith steak?
Who hires a maid to wash his money?
Who keeps politic ians on the take?
Who puts outspoken Third  Worlders in ja i l  
ju s t to shut them down?
Oh the lies vary fro m  place to place 
hut the truth is s t il l the same 
even in this town
Money junkies a ll over the w orld  
trample us on their way to the bank 
They run in every race 
Windego
Third Worlders see it  f irs t  
The dynamite, the dozers 
the cancer and the acid ra in
The corporate caterpillars come into our backyards, 
and turn the w orld  to pocket change
Excerpt fro m  "The Priests o f  the Golden B u l l” ,
B u ffy  Sainte-Marie




Instead of peace, the end of the Cold W ar has brought about more inter-
and intra-state wars, and rising social, political, economic and environmental 
unrest. Ursula Franklin suggests that this is because the world is essentially 
stuck with the military technological infrastructure of the Cold W ar era.^ “But in
 ̂The technological infrastructure is defined by Franklin in easy to understand language as “the way things 
are done around here’ (Franklin 1996,14).
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addition to the replacement of the threat of war between the big powers by war 
among smaller states, we have witnessed another form of the displacement of 
war; its displacement into the economic sphere” (Franklin 1996, 13). What 
Franklin is basically arguing is that since the Western technological war machine, 
which developed over the past four decades, has lost its external enemy —  the 
USSR —  it is now turning inward: “In the war of global competition the enemy 
are the people...” (Franklin 1996, 15).
The end of the Cold War, dissolution of the Soviet Union and globalization 
have set the stage for a radical transformation of the nature and perception of 
the term security. For many analysts and activists, security must now be defined 
beyond the inherently militaristic focus of state security to encompass a broader 
‘people-centred’ one. The latter sense of the concept of security attempts to find 
a means to ensure the socio-political and economical well-being of individuals, 
their communities and their environments. Ken Booth (1991) goes as far as to 
convincingly argue that security is, both theoretically and empirically, 
emancipation.
Furthermore, this critical perspective implies that a military response to 
security is in its own right a threat and a destabilizing force because: 1) a military 
response is not able to address the underlying causes of the conflict and may 
exacerbate the problems; 2) a military response, including an armaments build­
up, destroys the environment, undermines an economy and destabilizes political
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systems; and, 3) the mere presence of armaments and military alliances breeds 
a sense of insecurity between states and people. To adequately evaluate the 
effectiveness of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peacemaking as security 
policies, one must first begin to understand the changing perceptions and nature 
of global security. Global security provides the foundation of peacekeeping —  
that is to say, it gives peacekeeping purpose and meaning by identifying the 
relevant social actors and institutions, and historical agents involved.
Evaluating Peacekeeping
Although the academic literature clearly distinguishes the concept
peacekeeping from other related concepts riow including peacemaking, 
peacebuilding, preventive diplomacy and warmaking, in the popular media and 
political discourse it is used to refer to all of the above range of actions and 
more. In fact, in the 1980s, Ronald Reagan dubbed the MX missile 'the 
peacekeeper’. Such usage makes the term, ‘peacekeeping’, virtually 
meaningless and particularly useful for propaganda purposes (i.e. to disguise 
war, politicians call it a peacekeeping, peacemaking or peace enforcement 
mission).
Yet recent events, including the Gulf War, the exposed racism and 
violence of peacekeepers in Somalia, the attack on Mohammed Aideed in 
Somalia, and NATO bombings in the former Yugoslavia, have fostered a new 
and tarnished perception of peacekeeping. A popular dual image seems to
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prevail: 1) that peacekeeping done by the UN is ineffective and even weak, as 
exemplified by the UN’s inability to end the war in the former Yugoslavia; and 2) 
paradoxically that peacekeeping is used to make war sound like a good and 
noble act; for example the Gulf W ar is often described as a ‘peacemaking’ or 
‘peace enforcement’ mission.
Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has undertaken more 
peacekeeping missions than it did during its first 35 years of UN peacekeeping 
(Boutros-Ghali, 1995). These missions now vary in scope from direct military 
intervention —  the traditional peacekeeping role of impartially separating 
opposing forces —  to humanitarian relief, monitoring elections and disarming 
combatants. With these on-going changes in the broad area of UN 
peacekeeping it is essential to re-evaluate the very purpose of UN 
peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peacemaking as viable security policies. New 
questions need to be asked. In terms of global and human security— what is the 
role of peacekeeping in protecting, maintaining or re-establishing security? What 
is the role of international peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peacemaking in an 
ever globalizing^ world?
 ̂ In this thesis I use the terms, ‘global’, 'globalizing' and ‘globalization’ as a means to distinguish a drift or 
change from internationalism. Internationalism implies a relationship and/or interaction between 
sovereign nation states. By using the term 'globalization' I wish to convey the idea that agents of 
historical change have an existence and Impact beyond the nation state. The institutions of the United 
Nations, Bretton Woods, multi-national corporations and even civil society have a decision making power 
that is exclusive of and beyond the nation state. As well, there are politico-economic agents of history, i.e. 
class and gender, that form global structures. Lastly, there are environmental factors that have no 
relation to borders or nation states.
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Methodology
The following thesis offers a theoretical and analytical discussion based 
on a survey of available literature in the interrelated areas of: 1) peacekeeping, 
peacemaking, peacebuilding, preventive diplomacy, and 2) global security.
The thesis will define and assess the changing nature of global security in 
descriptive and analytical terms. In chapter two I will enlarge upon a specific 
political economy approach: international critical theory. This will provide the 
theoretical framework for a discussion on how global forces are not only 
changing our academic understanding of security but, as well, are impacting 
upon and creating new insecurities. These insecurities are leading many 
students of international relations to develop a new understanding of the world 
around and are leading us toward seeking new solutions and discarding old 
ones.
Secondly, the thesis will also review the various ways in which 
peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding operations have been 
evaluated. Then it will attempt to re-evaluate peacekeeping from a human and 
global security perspective comparing that re-evaluation to the more traditional 
evaluation processes.
The last chapter will be a broad evaluation of what global policies need 
and ought to be implemented to safeguard human and global security. Within
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the context of a human and global security approach the thesis will discuss what 
form or role the various types of peacekeeping may take.
Thesis Statement
Firstly, it is my contention and premise that a paradigm shift is occurring in
terms of global security issues. An objective and subjective transformation of a 
state-centred security system into a global and people centered security system 
is underway. And secondly, to best understand and utilize 'peacekeeping' it 
must be evaluated from, what 1 refer to as, the global-human security paradigm 
and in particular from an international critical theory which is based on 
Gramscian critical theory. International critical theory clearly outlines whose 
security and what security is to be protected. Thus criteria for evaluating 
peacekeeping are established.
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Framework
In reviewing the security and peace literature in this chapter, the focus will 
be restricted to understanding the various schools of thought regarding security 
that have developed since the mid 1900s. The literature on peace and security 
is immense; thus it is important to focus solely on that literature which helps 
further our understanding of what each school believes to be essential for 
"security". Although several key articles and books from earlier writers may be 
reviewed the main focus will be on the more contemporary literature of the 1980s 
and 1990s. This limited scope is chosen because it is over this period that a 
paradigmatic shift in the concept of security has occurred it is, moreover, it is a 
period of great transformation with the end of the Cold W ar and dissolution of the 
USSR. Through the literature review on security a theoretical framework will be 
developed.
Security Paradigms
International Relations has traditionally been confined to the exclusive
domain of Political Theory/Science, Security Studies and Strategic Studies —  
subsidiary research fields of International Relations. It is generally accepted by 
international relations practitioners and researchers that politics is at the core of 
their fields (Maclean 1981). This chapter will explore the theoretical implications
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of analyzing security from the perspective of the interdisciplinary field of 
International Development Studies.
It is only when we begin reformulating security —  by asking what is 
security, who implements and formulates security policy, and whose security is 
to be protected? —  that we get a more holistic understanding of global society. 
The central focus of this section will be to argue that the traditional security 
literature has: 1) failed to adequately describe the security dilemmas facing both 
communities and the globe; and, 2) has willfully ignored prescriptions that would 
safeguard the real security needs of people as opposed to a dominant class.
Last, in place of traditional security theories this chapter demonstrates that 
international critical theory is the best alternative for developing a theory of 
‘critical security studies’.
Albert Legault (1993) in a recent article attempts to identify the recent 
transformation in security studies. He argues that there are three security 
paradigms: 1) Peace through strength; 2) Peace through law; and, 3) an 
emerging one called the Trans-systemic (or ecological ) paradigm. Legault has 
overused and even abused the concept of paradigm.^ Ostensibly he is 
describing three schools of thought which share common assumptions and world 
views. The first two he identified correspond to what most authors refer to as the
 ̂ I base my understanding of the term 'paradigm' upon Thomas Kuhn's original work The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (1970). A paradigm is a shared set of assumptions, a priori knowledge, values, 
beliefs, language and terminology, and exemplars by a community. Where more than one paradigm exist, 
most of the time they do not share the same problems and concerns and where they do they have 
different conceptual definitions and methodological understandings of the issue.
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realist/neo-realist and idealist schools of international relations theory. The neo­
realist focus is on the military protection of the state. The idealist concern, on the 
other hand, is on building international norms and institutions to prevent conflict 
between states —  collective or common military security. The third school of 
thought, which is the closest to being a distinct paradigm, derives from the 
perceived need to protect the environment and maximize the survival of the 
planet. It is a rejection of the dominant mode of development and security with a 
focus on ethics. As it is presented by Legault, however, I argue that it is not a 
paradigm nor is it new because it continues to focus on the political elite and 
state-centric policies.
Legault continues by putting fonward a three-tiered security system based 
on the convergence of the first two paradigms. It would consist of a reinforced 
collective security system, a hard-core security system composed of European 
NATO powers, and a soft-core security system emerging from regional 
conferences and institutions (i.e. CSCE). The third paradigm would provide the 
ethical foundation for the first paradigm, suggesting that the earth’s very survival 
is dependent on sharing the planet’s resources.
Although Leg au It’s study purports to be about a paradigm shift he misses 
the point in the end by trying to create a synthesis between the three 'paradigms’
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as he envisages them.'’ His conclusion accepts the ethics of the third school but 
rejects its prescriptions as unrealistic. He is simply restating, using a variation of 
concepts, the traditional idealist argument that international norms and 
institutions are the required means to instil! a state of international security. His 
synthesis relies heavily on collective military security measures which is 
contradictory to his self described third paradigm.
John McMurty clearly represents those academics who are attempting to 
come to terms with the paradigm shift in security studies. He, on the other hand, 
strongly argues that there is only one hegemonic paradigm —  the “Military 
Paradigm” —  which has “operated across millennia as an established given of 
historical formation” (McMurty 1991, 415). McMurty describes this paradigm as 
reductively prescriptive with a conventionally assumed objective; “namely, 
national defence or war means the threat or the action of systematically killing, 
maiming, and destroying the life-supports of other human beings by maximally 
efficient means” (McMurty 1991, 418). The only choice within the military 
paradigm is “killing, maiming, and life-means destruction on the one hand or non- 
retaliatory pacifist non-violence on the other” (McMurty 1991, 419). The military 
paradigm benefits the social, political and military elite, increasing their wealth 
and power, while, for the most part, it uses young poor men as canon fodder and
 ̂Since paradigms are based on exclusive assumptions, values and basic beliefs it is impossible to combine 
two paradigms. Each paradigm requires a revolutionary leap in thinking and perception. As Thomas Kuhn 
(1970) asserts in his postscript, there is no ontological development from one scientific paradigm to the 
next.
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poorer countries as its killing fields. Its victims are the poor and the marginalized 
—  women, children and men who are not part of the circles of decision-making.
In conclusion, his article proposes non-military, life-enhancing principles o f ‘war’ 
to guide rational and moral agency. His description of the current security 
system is very accurate but his proposals for life enhancing principles of ‘war’ 
have very little social relevance. McMurty's study is a philosophical position 
needing to be translated into social theory policy.
A, W. Singham’s (1993) perspective, in Singh and Bernauer, Security of 
Third World Countries, is more descriptive and represents the more traditional 
neo-realist thinking. He argues that the two dominant security models are 1) the 
Western realists, who perceive the national security interests of the W est (the US 
in particular) as all encompassing, and 2) the socialist security system which is 
very much like the first. Singham, writing before the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, argues that a Third World security system based on Non-Alignment is the 
best alternative for nations in the South, giving them stronger independence from 
either the socialist or capitalist camps. With the end of the Cold War, however, 
the two superpowers no longer dominate or override the conflicts in the South 
with superpower interests. Conflicts in the Third World no longer need escalate 
into East-West conflicts. With the change in international politics, he argues, 
there is an opening for the old Non-Aligned Movement and other smaller nations 
to regain a voice in international politics.
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These three studies are recent examples of much of the literature that is 
available on security studies. Legault is very representative of the mainstream 
traditional school —  albeit leaning more toward the idealist school. He defines 
security from a state-centric military position and any argument not within that 
tradition (i.e. his description of the so-called ‘ecological paradigm’) is presented 
as unrealistic and focused solely on morality and ethics. McMurty, although 
radical in his approach, exemplifies much of (but is not necessarily 
representative of) the abundant and wide-ranging peace literature. His 
description of the war system is very accurate and apropos. He presents a 
Hegelian idealism which is philosophical in essence but provides little direction 
as to how to build an alternative security system. Singham is representative of 
much of the security literature coming from the Third World. It is often an 
attempt to put a Third World' twist on western conceptions of international 
relations and security.
Instead, from the vantage point of the late-1990s, I argue that there are 
two paradigms: 1) the Traditional Security paradigm, and 2) what I refer to as the 
Global-human Security paradigm. These two paradigms are fundamentally 
different. They constitute two completely different world views which do not 
share common assumptions and values. Table 1, below, gives an overview of 
the contrasting, even contradictory, assumptions contained in each.
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There are at least two major schools of thought in the literature, including 
the realists and idealists, which form the traditional security paradigm. Within 
this paradigm and within each school of thought are strains of a new school of 
thought based on a broader, more comprehensive, global perspective of 
security. Yet, within this traditional paradigm the underlying beliefs include the 
acceptance of the nation state as the unit of analysis, security of the state as 
paramount, and military alliances or collective security policies as the norm.
The second paradigm includes several schools of thought: Marxism, 
dependency theory, world systems theory and critical theory analysis. This 
paradigm, what I call the global-human security paradigm, is often excluded in 
the literature, as is typified above by the work of Legault. It shares the 
understanding that security is a broader concern with social, economic and 
political dimensions. As well, the state is not the central unit of analysis. In its 
place are class and other oppressive socio-economic structures. In essence, 
this is a political economy approach, but its main failing has been to separate 
and even ignore issues of security in favour of emancipation.
Traditional Security Paradigm
Traditional security studies, theory and policy, focus on the power of the
military to protect the nation state from internal disorder and, in particular, 
external aggression. Other aspects that deal with non-military security of human 
society, including environmental, cultural, social and economic power relations,
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have been ignored and even brushed aside by mainstream academia and 
political practitioners as secondary to the 'real power’ of the military.
International relations or security studies have focused almost exclusively on the 
political relationships between states.
John Negretto argues that both realism and idealism fall into what he calls 
"the ‘Hobbesian Trap,' the belief that a monopoly of violence is the necessary 
and sufficient condition for peace and order in a given community" (Negretto 
1993, 519). The idealist, who Negretto sometimes refers to as the world 
federalist, assumes that community order is maintained by keeping the elements 
of coercion with the state so that all that needs to be done to avoid war is to 
transfer that monopoly of coercion to an international system or regime. For 
realists, as long as the nation state is the basic unit of international relations, 
maintaining a balance-of-power is the only means to deter war (Negretto 1993, 
516-517). This helps to demonstrate that the categorization of the orthodox 
security literature into realist and idealist is not a rigid division and may at times 
be fluid; the two sides of the same coin.
Realism
One school of thought, the realist and neo-realist, has dominated the 
security debate for the past forty years or so. It perceives war as an inevitable, 
unfortunate, but sometimes necessary policy choice. This hegemonic approach 
includes writers such as Carl von Clausewitz, Raymond Aron, Kenneth Waltz,
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Medley Bull, Hans J. Morgenthau, Emma Rothschild and Henry Kissinger. This 
orthodox school is the mainstay of international relations thinking and perceives 
the idealist approach as naive, unrealistic, 'woolly-headed', and even dangerous. 
For example, in response to potential criticism that he may have ignored the vast 
litersture of the peace movement, Paul Hirst, a neo-realist, remarks;
I can find in Peace Movement writing no political analysis of how to 
achieve nuclear disarmament among the Great Powers, only pious 
invocations that it should happen and the belief that it will happen if 
enough people commit themselves to it. This is no more than the 
high min'^cd stock-in-trade of the ‘liberal conscience’ and it repeats 
a politics of moral earnestness, in other words, a non-politics, which 
has been with us since the nineteenth-century (Hirst 1987, 204 
original emphasis).
Colin Gray, who falls strongly into the neo-realist camp, presents another fine 
example of this type of hegemonic thinking:
In addition to being unattainable, visions of global security can 
have dangerous consequences in the behaviour that they may 
trigger or encourage on the part of their devotees. The behaviour 
appropriate to a globally secure world governed by saintly leaders 
is not the behaviour most suitable for a world at least partially 
populated by Serbian, Croatian, Iraqi and other tribal bands of 
thuggery. Inherently good ideas applied at the wrong time quite 
literally can kill (Gray 1994, 27).
The realist school is concerned primarily with power, essentially military 
power, which is not merely determined by the quantity or quality of weapons. It 
is determined by the geo-political position of a state and by the economic and 
industrial capacity of s country to build and maintain a military system. Or, to put 
it differently, security is safeguarded by the state’s capacity to deter external or
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interne iggression. Realists’ theories focus on balance-of-terror, arms control 
and balance-of-power, hegemonic versus bipolar and multi-polar power 
balances, game theory and other ‘rational’ theoretical arguments.
Central to all these realist perspectives is the sovereignty and power of 
the nation state. For neo-realists the state is the primary actor in international 
relations, and the quintessential threat to security is the fear of military attack on 
the state by another state. In turn the state is perceived, even defined, as the 
only legitimate authority allowed to use violence to protect its sovereignty from 
external aggression or internal disorder (Aron 1968 & 1995; Rothschild 1995; 
Kissinger 1995; Waltz 1959).
From a realist perspective, the international system, governed by state 
relations, is characterized as Hobbesian in nature. That is, it is an anarchical 
system. Each nation state acts for and on behalf of its own “national interests”. 
The protection of the state’s sovereignty includes protecting its political and 
economic interests, even when they are well outside its borders or domain of 
influence. The strong and mighty will prevail, and it is only when a balance-of- 
power or hegemony is established that the security of the state is safeguarded. 
A key axiom of the realist is that war is politics by other means. Thus, from this 
established perspective war is not considered a failure in policy, but rather a 
calculated policy choice pursued by rational state leaders.
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Mohammed Ayoob (1995), in his recent book, The Third World Security 
Predicament, attempts to define security from an alternative Third World 
perspective. Yet his definition sits upon the foundations of Western neo-realist 
thinking. Ayoob, a Third World neo-realist, is unwilling or unable to understand 
security outside of the realm of inter-state politics.
In other words, debt burdens, rain-forest decimation, or even 
famine do not become part of the security calculus for our purposes 
unless they threaten to have political outcomes that either affect 
the survivability of state boundaries, state institutions, or governing 
elites or weaken the capacity of states and regimes to act 
effectively in the realm of both domestic and international politics 
(Ayoob 1995, 9).
The Gulf W ar is a perfect example of how the dominant political elite act 
within the confines of neo-realist thinking. The concern of the United States and 
Europe in leading a war against Iraq had nothing to do with the political, 
economic or social welfare of people who live within the bounds of Iraq’s brutal 
military dictatorship or under the oppressive oligarchic rule of Kuwait. One of the 
central reasons for that war was to prevent Iraq from becoming the hegemonic 
power of the Middle East which could have excluded Western interests and 
would have threatened cheap oil supplies to the developed western world.
Idealism/Internationalism
The idealist approach to security and peace has a long history. In the
modern era it is associated with classical writers such as Emmanuel Kant or
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Claude Henri Saint-Simon, and presently it includes writers such as Albert 
Legault, Inga Thorsson, Michael Doyle among many others.
War from the idealist perspective is not only unfortunate; it is also not an 
inevitability and is an unnecessary behaviour of people and/or systems. It can 
be avoided by institutionalizing international norms and agreements between 
sovereign states.
Kant proposed that states have to accept three “definitive articles” which 
once accepted will lead to a state of perpetual peace (Betts 1994). The first 
definitive article is that the civil constitution of every state should be republican. 
Kant suggested that states would naturally gravitate towards becoming a 
republic since it was the most efficient and best way to organize government.^
The second definitive article is that the law of nations shall be founded on 
a federation of free states, forming a pacific federation or pacific union.® Thus, 
according to Doyle, it seems that what Kant is suggesting is a collective security 
arrangement among states that is built upon a reciprocal understanding that their 
security is mutual. And Doyle suggests that such a collective security 
arrangement may rely on the third definitive article which is a cosmopolitan law 
that is “limited to conditions of universal hospitality” (Doyle 1986, 1158).
 ̂“By republican Kant means a political society that has solved the problem of combining moral autonomy, 
individualism, and social order" (Doyle, 1986: 1156).
® The pacific union is not an international government or a single peace treaty among all states. An 
international government or world stale, according to Kant, was not very likely and if there was such a 
stale the risk of it being tyrannical was too high a cost. A single peace treaty would not be sufficient to 
maintain peace.
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From the Kantian perspective, once republican states are established they 
are prone to avoid war because the citizens, to whom the constitution is 
responsible, are more hesitant to fight since they are the ones who must bear 
the cost. But as Doyle points out this alone does not make for peaceful 
relations. A republic builds a culture that is respectful and accepting of 
differences, and this is projected onto the international arena. This positive 
interaction as part of the cosmopolitan law of universal hospitality encourages 
economic cooperation between liberal republican states —  it "...permits the ‘spirit 
of commerce’ sooner or later to take hold of every nation, thus impelling states to 
promote peace and to try to avert war" (Doyle 1986, 1161).
Doyle adds that a further benefit of liberalism to international peace, is 
that in a liberal republic the market is separate from the state which enables the 
s^ate to act as an impartial negotiator when contentious international market 
issues arise (Doyle 1986).
Yet, liberal democracies will go to war with non-democracies because 
they cannot trust another state which is not openly governed and constrained by 
representation. Liberal republics are willing to protect their ‘democratic rights’ 
against non-democracies because they “...do not authentically represent the 
rights of individuals” (Doyle 1986, 1162).
David Forsythe questions “whether democracies might engage in covert 
forcible action against each other?” (Forsythe 1992, 385). His is not an empirical
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study, but is based on cases in which he argues that the United States used 
covert forcible action against a series of elected governments in Third World 
countries during the Cold War. The evidence is clear and well supported that in 
at least six cases the US did use forcible covert action against elected 
governments.^ In another three cases of covert action, the US used 
propaganda, political influence and economics in an effort to dictate government 
policies.® Other cases of covert action have been asserted but not 
substantiated.® Forsythe suggests that the US used these covert actions 
because they feared that the governments in place were either too Leninist in 
their approach or were too soft on Leninism.
The distinction between these covert actions and war is somewhat 
academic. The end goal is the same whether a government or state system is 
overthrown by covert action or direct invasion.^® These violent actions on the 
part of the US do not support and in fact fly in the face of Kant’s and modern 
liberal theories of a pacific union of democratic republics. The US committed
 ̂These cases of violent covert actions include the following; Iran (1953). Guatemala (1954), Indonesia 
(1957), Brazil (from 1961), Chile (1973) and Nicaragua (from 1984). (Forsythe 1992, 385). Some of 
these examples are not covert and were very much overt actions at the time including Nicaragua, Chile 
and the Dominican Republic (Sorensen 1992).
® These cases of political covert actions include the following; British Guyana (from 1953), Costa Rica (from 
1955), and Ecuador (from 1960). (Forsythe 1992, 385).
® These assertions of political covert actions include the following; the United Kingdom (1959), the
Dominican Republic (1965), Greece (1967), Jamaica (from 1976), and India (at various times). (Forsythe 
1992, 385). The Invasion of Grenada is sad example of US covert action followed by direct military 
intervention,
’°T h e  mining of Nicaragua's harbours and funding of the Contra guerrillas by the United States is perfect 
example of a covert action where the distinction between covert actions and war is blurred. In essence 
the United States hired a private army to fight its war with Nicaragua.
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itself to these types of actions because it perceived its economic and political 
interests to be at risk and these democracies, since they are not liberal 
democracies as defined by the US, are expendable. As George Sorensen 
points out,
Thus, not any kind of democracy is smoothly integrated in the 
pacific union envisaged by Kant; and it appears that those who are 
met with enmity instead of amity are the mass-dominated 
democracies, defined as regimes where mass actors have gained 
the upper hand' and push for reforms from below, attacking the 
power and privilege of the elites (Sorensen 1992, 405).
Barry Buzan argues that there is a strong and durable link between 
international political economy and the content of the international security 
agenda (Buzan 1994, 99). Buzan’s argument is a well developed attempt to 
bridge the gap between the neo-realists and the idealists. Buzan relies on the 
framework that the international system is anarchical and that we must consider 
security at three levels: the individual, the state and the international system 
(Dalby 1992).’  ̂ But he also recognizes that the self-interest of one state may 
infringe upon the security of another state or upon the security of the individual. 
Thus, like the idealist, he advocates that increased interaction between states 
leads to a recognition by state leaders that international cooperation is within 
their security interests. He does not argue, and counters the contention, that 
economic relations determine security ones, but “the danger arises when malign 
economic structures occur in tandem with other political and military elements of
These three levels are based on Kenneth W altz’s classical treatment of war and peace (Waltz 1959). 
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strategic instability...” (Buzan 1994, 100). Buzan is clear in stating that a more 
stable international environment is dependent on a Western-style political and 
economic maturity being Imposed on states and the international system (Buzan 
1994; Dalby 1992).
The record to date, argues Sorensen, against the smaller mass- 
democracies (non-Western Third World countries) being allowed to pursue their 
own policy goals and needs has not been very good. The dominant liberal 
democracies and the international institutions which they control, “the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, are at pains to stress 
promotion of the strictly liberal elements of the new democracies; privatizations, 
public sector cutbacks, free market policies, the protection of private property” 
(Sorensen 1992, 405).
Although the security of the nation state is important from the idealist 
perspective, its security must be safeguarded by collective, cooperative or 
common international military security systems. The United Nations could be 
one such vehicle, while more radical liberal perspectives call for international 
government and an international army. Yet, once again, the underlying premise 
of security here is focused on its military aspect. Western liberal democracies 
would continue to perceive the existence of non-liberal democracies as 
destabilizing forces. Denser liberal economic relations could help define a more 
peaceful international relationship between states, but ultimately, political and
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military agreements would be the centre-pieces for international security. Thus 
the formation of a military alliance of collective or common security, or the 
institutionalizing of an international army (or global peacekeeping force) may 
exclude and even oppose the existence of non-liberal democracies.
It is of interest to note that Hirst attempts to argue that Kant’s Perpetual 
Peace and Schell's The Abolition are better categorized in the vein of "rea/po#k” 
along the lines of Hobbes. Yet, Hirst seems to be ignoring the very premise of 
Kant’s Perpetual Peace which relies on a should, because it is in their interests, 
states should agree to a series of articles, including that “no state shall by force 
interfere with another state” (Kant in Hirst 1987, 206-207). Essentially this is no 
different and no more political than the arguments put fonward by many 
disarmament authors, including the argument which asserts that it is in the 
interests of all people that they should organize to change state policies. It is not 
the purpose of this chapter to debate Hirst. However, it seems that ail he has 
done is to re-categorize Schell and Kant to attempt to prove that the only viable 
policies for peace are from the realist school of thought.^^
Hirst is correct when he states that most, if not all, of the idealist literature 
is based on Ifs and shoulds. But he misunderstands much of the literature when 
he states that it is not realistic and is non-political. In fact, his statement says 
more about his aim than it does about the idealist peace literature. Some of the
see Negretto 1993 for further and opposing discussions on Kant pages 501-523.
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latter is based on the moral Imperative that peace is the right way and thus we 
should pursue that path. There is essentially nothing wrong with such a goal but 
relying on ifs and shoulds as the means forward leaves the theory in practice on 
shaky ground. What Hirst and the realists forget is that realism is built upon 
theory. And, just as much as any other tradition, it too has its normative values 
—  ‘an elite group are best at governing’ and 'the state is the centre of power 
protecting individuals’ are both norms of realism. The idealist literature puts 
fonward a variety of policy alternatives ranging from reforms of the United 
Nations, to verified arms control agreements, to economic development 
alternatives, to massive societal reforms. As well, its political agendas range 
from liberal to radical liberal. Some of these policies have been accepted in the 
past as realistic alternatives. Idealism is based on the assumption that change 
occurs by influencing ideas and the political elite, and restructuring international 
norms.
Criticisms of the traditional security paradigm
Within both schools of the traditional security paradigm further
developments are now being made to account for areas other than the military,
which impact upon security, as well as to account for the globalization of security
policies. Yet, the underlying concentration has not changed. The traditional
security paradigm ignores economic and social power relations as agents of
historical change.
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Recently, Buzen (1994), for example, has attempted to argue the 
interdependence between economic and security issues from a traditional 
perspective, a synthesis between idealism and realism. It is evident that he fails 
to further the argument as originally put forward by Kant. His central thesis is 
that increased economic relations will provide the opportunity for creating more 
cooperative International relations. Underlying his argument Is that the 
transplanting of Western values, including Western (read liberal) state structures 
and the global capitalist system, on to Third World and Eastern states is 
necessary for international security and stability. Yet, he has failed to recognize 
or understand the global capitalist structure and its violent impact on peoples 
around the world. Instead he isolates NATO’s relations and global capitalism as 
the military and economic model that the rest of the world would be best to 
pursue if they want security and stability. To put it simply, what Buzan is arguing 
is that if everyone was like us and did what we (the Western world) wanted, then 
there would be security and stability.
So, notwithstanding the end of bipolarity, the traditional security paradigm 
continues to focus on the political-military elite and the state as the only actors of 
power and change. The state-centrism of idealism and realism assumes that 
communities and individuals are protected by the state. It is evident that around 
the globe states not only fail in protecting their people but are too often the 
violators of their physical, social and economic security. To name a few 
examples: the government of Nigeria has recently demonstrated its disregard for
Peter Coombes Peacetimes or Wartimes Page 26
political dissent by executing political activists; Guatemala continues to use its 
armed forces to suppress indigenous groups; China continues to arrest and 
harass democracy advocates; Saudi Arabia denies basic human rights to half its 
population, women; Iraq Is a brutal dictatorship; the autocracy of Kuwait ensures 
its power and wealth, in part, by denying citizenship to hundreds of thousands of 
people; in the United States a high proportion of blacks suffer from poverty, and 
black men are grossly over represented in US prisons; and, in Canada 
indigenous people suffer humiliating poverty, discrimination and marginalization, 
John McMurty boldly states that it is a well-known fact that ruling groups have 
used 'national security’ to justify and maintain their class hold on their privileged 
positions of office or wealth (McMurty 1991, 422). The effect of what he calls the 
military paradigm "is to increase the wealth and power of the already wealthy and 
powerful” (McMurty 1991, 415).
Global-human Security Paradigm
The second paradigm —  what I call the global-human security paradigm
—  has developed out of a long tradition of radical political economy. It includes 
a vast spectrum of writers and political leaders from Karl Marx to Vladimir Lenin, 
Rosa Luxemburg, and many other Marxists whose main concern was 
imperialism. As well, this paradigm includes neo-Marxists and non-Marxists such 
as Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein, Samir Amin and even Johan 
Galtung, who focus on forms of international dependency, world systems theory 
and structural imperialism. These schools, in general, perceive war as an
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inevitable consequence of the contradictions within capitalism, whether it be 
Western capitalist conflicts and domination or global capitalism. From a radical 
political economy perspective, the prescription for ending war is the creation of a 
world in which all states are socialist or the dissolution of the international 
dependence between centre and periphery. This is not so different from the long 
standing liberal tradition based on Kant’s perpetual peace, which states that 
once all governments are liberal democratic then war will essentially come to an 
end. What is essentially different about the radical perspective is that class or 
world structures of inequality are recognized as the factors impeding the 
emancipation of people. Using the language^^ of the traditional security 
paradigm, the major focus of the radical perspective is social and economic 
security.
Arising out of this vast literature is an expanded theory of international 
relations. It concerns itself with problems and issues not normally accepted by 
the traditional paradigm as vital to understanding international relations. The 
structures causing global economic inequality, food insecurity, militarism, and 
environmental degradation are vital security issues as opposed to the (collective) 
military security of states.
The language of these two paradigms, traditional and global-human security, is often very different and 
even contradictory. Security, meaning military security, is not often used in the global-human security 
paradigm and is essentially a meaningless term unless one refers to political, economic, food, health, 
and/or ecological security.
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Within the literature of the global-human security paradigm one can find 
certain aspects of all the schools discussed above, but there are constitutive 
underlining assumptions and beliefs to which the old schools do not adhere, 
accept or even understand. These are as follows: 1) the security of the nation 
state is not central and is often insignificant and unimportant in analysis: 2) 
security of individuals and people(s) is paramount; 3) security and sustainability 
of the environment is essential to our very survival; 4) economic, social and 
political security based on equality, freedom and emancipation are essential in 
preventing conflict; 5) wars benefit the wealthy and powerful giving them even 
more wealth and power further escalating class conflict; and, 6) so called ‘military 
security’ or militarism is in and of Itself a threat to human and global security.
The latter is so because: a) a military response is not able to address the 
underlying causes of the conflict and may even exacerbate the problems; b) a 
military response, including an armaments build-up, destroys the environment, 
undermines economies and destabilizes political systems; and, c) the mere 
presence of armaments and military alliances breeds a sense of insecurity 
between states and people.
Critical Theory
One of the more developed schools within the global-human security 
paradigm which consciously addresses security issues is critical international 
theory analysis. Critical theory developed out of the Frankfurt school and its 
theoretical foundations are built upon the early writings of Marx. In particular it
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draws on Marx’s theory of dialectics as the means to understanding historical 
development and change (Veltmeyer 1974/1975, 1978). Unlike orthodox 
Marxists, who succumb to economic reductionism, international critical theory 
equally emphasizes ideology and economic hegemony as developed in the 
writings of Antonio Gramsci.^"*
The traditional security paradigm claims to be an objective science or 
theory. John Maclean aptly demonstrates that international theory (the 
traditional paradigm) is ideological In the sense that it has distorted 'reality' by 
removing "... the theoretical power of the totality of social relations on the one 
hand, and the historical and social context of concrete and empirical social 
relations at all levels on the other” (Maclean 1981. 119). He goes on to state;
... that the hoi 1st methodology developed by Marx is superior. It 
includes, or more precisely, starts from, the phenomena observable 
to us in international relations, but also offers both a coherent and 
sustained epistemological basis for going beyond reality as it 
appears to be, and a secure platform from which to oppose, within 
the discipline and the practice of international relations, that view 
which holds that international relations are fundamentally and 
timelessly irrational (Maclean 1981, 120).
One of the leaders in critical international theory, Robert Cox, builds on 
historical materialism using Gramsci’s concept of hegemony.^^ “Hegemony at
For an excellent introduction and overview of Gramscian political economy I refer the reader to j 
Heoemonv and the ‘New' World Order: A Gramscian Analysis of Global Restructuring, a master’s thesis 
by David Hooey (1992).
Cox demonstrates that Gramsci applies hegemony to the bourgeoisie, the dominant class. And since 
their hegemony is entrenched in civil society they do not have to run the state themselves. Hegemony is 
not the dominance of one state over another it is a world order of class interests based on an historical 
reality. For a detailed discussion see Cox (1983).
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the international level is thus not merely an order among states. It is an order 
within a world economy with a dominant mode of production...” (Cox 1983, 171). 
Hegemony is not to be conflated with dominance of one state over another. 
Hegemony, in the Gramscian sense, is realized when there is widespread 
acceptance of the predominant ideology and economic conditionalities of a 
leading class. It is not based on a crude economic determinism or state- 
centrism, as in orthodox Marxism. Hegemony must be contested and 
“...determined by a range of national, cultural, economic and historical factors” 
(Hooey 1992, 30). This sets the theoretical foundations for an international 
relations theory which can be more inclusive and more holistic, in that it includes 
social, political, economic, gender and environmental security issues.
As well, Cox states that ‘[t]heory is always for someone and for some 
purpose’ (Cox 1981, 128 original emphasis). So, while traditional security 
thinking is preoccupied with trying to influence the state and political elite with its 
ideology of realpolitik, critical security studies is geared toward the security, 
protection and even emancipation of the politically and economically 
marginalized from structures of oppression and violence (Jones 1995; Cox 1981; 
Dalby 1991). Critical international relations theory questions the very 
foundations of security studies. It is, as delineated by Cox (1981), concerned 
with the historical process. It questions the nature and the means of institutions 
and socio-political relations and whether or not they may be changing. It asks:
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what is security; whose security are we to be concerned with; what insecurities 
do they face; and who are the actors of change?
Critical Security Studies insists on taking the broader security 
agenda seriously. This does not entail any attempt to deny or 
ignore the continuing salience or importance of military security. It 
does mean, however, that proponents of Critical Security Studies, 
by placing ‘the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the 
unrepresented, the powerless’ at the centre of its agenda recognize 
that for most of the world’s population, apparently ‘marginal’ or 
‘esoteric’ concerns —  such as environmental security, food security 
and economic security —  are far more real and immediate threats 
to security than interstate war. Indeed in very many cases, and not 
only in the disadvantaged South, the arms purchased and the 
powers accrued by governments under the guise of protecting their 
citizens from interstate war are far more potent threats to the 
security of those citizens than any putative foreign enemy. 
Eschewing the statism of mainstream security discourse, 
proponents of Critical Security Studies recognize that, globally, the 
sovereign state is one of the main causes of insecurity; it is part of 
the problem rather than the solution (Jones 1995, 309-310).
In the dominant world of global realpolitik, the sovereign nation state is the 
guardian of security. Yet from an individual, community, environmental or global 
perspective such a state within the capitalist system is the protector of a small 
political, economic and military elite, “...whose main purpose is to maintain and 
strengthen these groups’ already dominant position” (Jones 1995, 311).
The Westphalian system of the nation state as the protector of the 
individual is failing at the human and global level (Booth 1991). The state is 
unable to protect the individual or community from global economic forces and is 
even the perpetuator of social-political human rights violations (Makhijani 1991).
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At the global level the state system is unable to deal with international and global 
environmental disasters and is the perpetrator of the threat of nuclear 
annihilation.
Critical international relations theory provides an historical means of 
understanding the hegemony of the global capitalist system. With such a 
theoretical reference point a more holistic understanding of security issues 
becomes apparent and easier to understand.
International Critical Theory as a Theoretical Framework
This chapter has reviewed the various schools and debates that are
presently pursued in the international security literature, including the realist, 
neo-realist and idealist schools of thought. Furthermore, it has brought in the 
debate emerging out of the global-human security paradigm, namely the 
international critical theory school which is questioning the very foundations of 
international relations theory.
it has been argued that international critical theory provides a superior 
understanding of international relations and security for those who believe the 
purpose of analysis Is to search for ways to improve peoples’ lives. The 
traditional security paradigm has focused on the security of the state and the 
governing elite at the expense of security for communities and people(s). It over­
accentuates the political power relations between states, thus falling into the trap 
of simplistic reductionism. Critical security theory examines global social,
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cultural, economic and political power structures as a holistic system. This in 
turn provides a more holistic understanding of the hegemony of the global 
capitalist system. Finally, as a more inclusive theory that focuses on the 
marginalized, it helps highlight the ‘real’ security and insecurity dilemmas facing 
people, as opposed to those emphasized by the ruling hegemony.
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Chapter 3
The Real World of Traditional Security
This chapter describes the various aspects of what in this thesis I refer to 
as the traditional security paradigm, portrayed in Figure 1 below. This is the
Figure /  Hierarchy o f  traditional security paradigm
Elite governing 
structure
State military and 
economic control
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main concept of security that has survived since the seventeenth century, it is a 
form of militarism, and “has been defined almost entirely in terms of national 
survival needs" (Commission on Global Governance 1995, 78-79). The 
traditional security structure is hierarchical. Essentially, it is based on military 
structures and assumes that an elite governing structure can ensure the security
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of a whole population. The state, using military, economic and political powers, 
controls its population and maintains its interests in an anarchical state system.
National Security
Security from this perspective simply means that the state (or potentially a
larger regime which supersedes the state, as proposed by world federalists) is 
the only structure that has the legitimate right to use coercive power to ensure 
that law and order are maintained. Thus security is a matter of protecting state 
or regime stability from external or internal acts of aggression.
Within this perspective, the state’s monopoly of the use of coercive power 
is not questioned; in fact, such power is seen as essential for security. What is 
questioned is the configuration of power within and between states. Thus within 
this perspective, the various schools of thought debate who within a regime has 
legitimacy to exert coercive power. For example, in a liberal democracy to what 
extent is the military responsible to democratic forces? Traditionally, even in 
liberal democracies, foreign affairs and military relations have been highly 
secretive areas of decision making with very limited democratic participation, all 
for reasons of “national security”.
In addition the debate is about how states should best improve military 
power relations between each other. This includes debates on topics such as: 1) 
what size of military is needed in a particular geo-strategic position; 2) whether or 
not a multi-polar balance-of-power is more stable than either a bipolar balance-
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of-power or hegemonic power; and 3) is a nuclear weapons system more secure 
than a conventional weapons system?
The debate also includes discussions on how to best maximize the 
benefits of political agreements between states —  what type of state coalition 
agreements can strengthen state security, and regional, bilateral, multilateral or 
international agreements? But in general the state remains prima facia:
International stability and cooperation are welcomed by most states 
in the world, only because most states support the status quo, but 
this does not mean that their commitment to some ideal of 
international cooperation supersedes or contradicts their 
attachment to their own state interests (Holmes 1993, 334).
Collective Security
Collective security is a term used by both the realist and idealist schools;
but each has very different underlining assumptions when using the term. In the 
idealist literature, collective security relies on all international actors renouncing 
the use of coercive force and accepting international law. This perspective will 
be further discussed under the heading of ‘common security' in the following 
chapter. This thesis uses the term collective security only in the realist sense of 
its meaning, described below.
From the traditional paradigm perspective, James Goodby (1993) 
effectively argues that collective security does not have to be "a universal 
alliance committed to the automatic use of force anywhere in the world against
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any aggressor no matter what the circumstances" (Goodby 1993, 305).
Collective security has a basic underlying military base. Goodby outlines a 
number of criteria for when collective military action should be taken. It does not 
represent a fundamental change to the concept of collective security. The 
principle remains unchallenged, that military power will be used, but it will only be 
used within particular and pre-arranged conditions. Furthermore, whether 
collective security includes all states or is a small group of nations, the central 
proposition is that if one of the states is attacked, then by a pre-arranged moral 
and legal agreement the members of the collective security pact will act as 
though all were attacked. As a united military force the states will use their 
collective military power (from threats to actual military intervention) to coerce the 
attacker to meet their demands (Morgenthau in Goodby 1993, 304). Lastly, 
collective security does not rule out intervention in another country’s domestic 
affairs as long as the collective pact perceives the actions of that state as a 
threat to one or all of them. It is in this direction that peacekeeping in the 1990s 
is heading under the leadership of the United States.
As outlined in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the conditions of 
collective security are based on the same fundamental military principles as 
discussed above. “It is inherently military focused” (Commission on Global 
Governance 1995, 80). There is a normative dimension to collective security 
(and military alliances as discussed next). Collective security is based on the 
assumption that states and governing elites will adhere to their moral and legal
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obligations. For example, it is assumed that the US and Britain will not use their 
nuclear weapons against each other since they are NATO partners. If the 
international system were truly based on military might and power and was an 
anarchical system such disputes would not be inconceivable.
It should be ncted that in principal, collective security as envisaged under 
the Charter of the United Nations is profoundly different from collective security 
of military alliances, such as NATO which I explain in more detail below. In 
practice, the use of collective security undertaken by the United Nations have 
essentially been missions of collective defence. The Korean war, although 
officially a UN collective security action, was clearly a United States ‘defence’ 
action to curtail the spread of communism. The Gulf War, although defended as 
a legally constituted collective security action, was a full-fledged US-lead military 
invasion of Iraq.
Military Alliances
Military alliances have played major roles in traditional security systems.
Until recently such International military politics were dominated by the Cold War 
and its two alliances, NATO and the W ARSAW  Pact. Although Third World 
countries formed the Non-Aligned Movement, the Eastern and Western alliances 
affected the very security and foreign policy of every nation in the world by 
actively involving themselves in conflicts around the world.
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Traditional security perceives military alliances as a type of collective 
defence, and once again, it is assumed and strongly argued that such alliances, 
if properly maintained and organized, will enhance a country’s security by 
counter-balancing other military powers, be they countries or alliances. The UN 
is now partially playing this role since the end of the Cold War. Enabling 
coalitions to act on its behalf in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and the Gulf War 
are prime examples of this new role for the UN. As a collective security agency 
the UN has legitimized the ability of coalitions (US and NATO led) to do 
peacekeeping' (warmaking might be a better term) from an offensive and non­
neutral stance. In the three cases just mentioned the UN has gone beyond its 
Cold W ar role of acting as a impartial peacekeeper to become a third actor in 
those conflicts. The UN Security Council, which is an oligarchy of western 
states, is acting upon and protecting western interests. It is my belief that it is 
mere double speak to refer to NATO bombings against Serbian forces as part of 
UN peacekeeping or peacemaking. No matter what one thinks of the actions of 
the Serbian forces, these bombings were state violence, implemented for and on 
behalf of a western military alliance, and thus these actions can only be referred 
to as ‘acts of war’.
In the case of the Gulf War, traditional security appeared to work very 
well. Not only was Iraq removed from Kuwait but the potential regional military 
power and hegemony that Iraq could have built was demolished, ensuring that 
Western interests were not threatened in the region (Hippier 1994). In the case
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of the former Yugoslavia, the collective use of military force has enforced a 
Western dominated peace accord. In the case of Somalia, here is what one 
author has had to say:
It was a mistake to allow Admiral Howe’s gun diplomacy to 
dominate, for right from the start it undermined even the idea of 
peace. In the event, the UN reverted to the bullying tactics of a 
Rambo on the rampage and lost, giving Aideed’s rag-tag army of 
flip-flop-wearing militiamen the erroneous impression that they had 
won a historic battle.
Back to squaring the circle of terror, we are forever hostages 
to the warlords. To the UN, I would say: 'Good riddance’; to the 
warlords: ‘Plague on your plunder’ —  and to peace: ‘Please come 
where you are most welcome. W e’ve missed you! (Farah 1995).
As an outcome of collective security, and even due to perceived national 
security needs, nation states have created and maintained various forms of 
military alliances. The balance-of-power between the Warsaw Pact and NATO  
alliances have been considered, in the theoretical literature, as the fundamental 
force that has kept world peace from 1945 to the late 1980s. Within the various 
schools there is much debate about how the balance-of-power manifested itself, 
ranging from those who believed an unlimited and uncontrolled build-up of 
nuclear armaments was essential to those who put forward the belief that arms 
control was essential in maintaining a balance-of-terror.
Armaments procurement and production
Another outcome of traditional security is that the very power base of a
nation, military alliance or collective security system is military procurement and
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production. From this perspective the show of strength, and thus security, is in 
the economic and industrial capacity of a nation to design and manufacture 
weapons systems or, alternatively, to purchase weapons systems. The larger 
and more pervasive the military industrial complex of a nation or military bloc, 
supposedly the more stable the security system.
The concept of traditional security has provided the rationale for creating 
powerful national military systems, for selling, procuring and producing massive 
arsenals of conventional and nuclear armaments, and for forming exclusive 
military alliances. These are the hroad policy approaches that are supposed to 
provide security —  security being the protection against internal or external 
aggression.
The 1980s were characterized by some as the age of militarization 
(Wallensteen, 1985). Global military spending peaked in 1987 at $995 billion US 
and since that time it has gradually decreased, reaching $767 billion US in 1994 
(Commission on Global Governance 1995, 124). From the 1960s to 1992 Third 
World military expenditures grew three times faster than similar expenditures 
among the industrialized countries. From 1973 to 1989 total Third World real 
military expenditure went from $95.3 billion to a massive $220 billion (1982 
constant US dollars). Arms imports for the same period had an average annual 
growth rate of 7% (Suchman and Eyre 1992, 137). More recent figures show 
that military expenditures have begun to decline for Third World countries and
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that global arms transfers have dropped from just over $70 billion in 1987 to $32 
billion in 1993 —  the largest portion of this reduction being due to Russian/Soviet 
Union reductions which have gone from just over $30 billion to $2.8 billion. Yet 
the Third World continues to be the primary purchaser of arms. In 1993, the 
Third World consumed 65% of global arms transfers (Commission on Global 
Governance 1995, 127).
It is no coincidence that the five major exporters of weapons and weapon- 
systems have been and continue to be the five permanent powers of the UN 
Security Council (Commission on Global Governance 1995, 127). These exports 
not only helped to subsidize their own military industries but fit well with their 
political and economic foreign policies, which constituted attempts to encourage 
Third World nations to remain or become loyal to one side or the other in a 
divided world. Part of the result has been massive military spending by 
governments and the establishment of military governments in the Middle East 
and in South and East Asia (Kaldor in SIPRI, 1985; Myrdal, 1976).
Small Arms
Throughout East and Southeast Asia and throughout the Middle East 
there continue to be arms races between China and Taiwan, India and Pakistan 
and even escalating arms buildups in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Most of the 
build-up is in the area of small armaments.
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Another major factor and concern is that small arms are playing a larger 
role in conflicts around the world. It is very difficult to control the manufacture 
and purchase of these weapons, and since they are relatively cheap a state or 
group can buy thousands of small machine guns for the price of what one tank 
would have cost. The world market is glutted with M-16s, AK-47s, Stinger 
surface-to-surface missiles, landmines of all types and many other weapons 
(Rana 1995). “Many of the small arms used in Rwanda were reported to be 
shipped in from Uganda where an AK-47 could be obtained for the price of a 
chicken” (Rana 1995, 5). So, although arms transfers in terms of dollar amounts 
are decreasing, the number of small arms and problems associated with them is 
expected to increase.
Until recently, small arms were considered somewhat marginal to 
the international arms trade. Now, it is being increasingly 
recognized by some major military manufacturers that small arms 
may well be the weapons faced worldwide in actual situations of 
combat into the late 1990's and the early 21st century. The United 
States is believed to have made the maximum investment in 
research and development on small arms (Rana 1995, 6).
These are the weapons of choice for small insurgency groups and it is 
Third World states that are most often faced with such conflicts. The likely 
response of military and autocratic regimes will be a further restriction of social 
and political rights which in turn will incite further cause for rebellion and uprising.
From the extreme end of the traditional security perspective, more 
armaments equals more security, although a more moderate view would argue
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that arms-control, arms-agreements and even arms-ümitations may provide a 
more balanced and thus a more secure system.
Military Security IS Security
This chapter has attempted to briefly demonstrate that in practice the real
world of traditional security is focused almost exclusively on military power. This 
preoccupation of militarism is packaged in a variety of ways, some more 
benevolent than others. All focus on an international system of military stability. 
While some focus on arms control and stability (collective and common security) 
others focus on military superiority and/or dominance (national or collective 
defence and alliances). And all are concerned with the military security of the 
state as opposed to the economic cultural and political well-being of people and 
the ecological survival of the earth.
The following chapter will address current post-Cold W ar security issues.
It will demonstrate that the traditional security paradigm is unable to address 
these issues. Thus, these objective conditions are realizing the development of 
a new global-human security paradigm. The social political rise of this paradigm, 
inevitably, makes it more inclusive of the rising security issues facing individuals, 
communities and the globe.
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Chapter 4 
The Changing World of Global Security Trends
War has been and is the central security issue which most visibly impacts 
upon states and people around the world. Although, since the end of the Cold 
War, world military spending and arms transfers to the developing world have 
decreased, in 1994, thirty-nine major conflicts continued to be waged around the 
world, the majority of which were being fought in the developing countries of the 
South (Project Ploughshares, 1995). Most of these conflicts are internal/civil 
wars with the larger proportion of the victims being civilian non-combatants who 
are maimed and killed in the battles, and are left homeless and starving because 
of the war’s destructive power. Since 1945, it is estimated that well over 40 
million people have died because of the direct and indirect effects of war. And 
from 1987 to 1994 the number of war refugees doubled from 13 million to 26 
million people while the number of internally displaced persons has shown an 
even more dramatic increase (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). Children and women are 
among the prime victims of war.
It is within this context of the growing destructive impact war has on 
societies and people and within the context of the growing internationalization 
and even globalization of military, social, economic and environmental problems 
that the very nature and perceptions of security have changed. This chapter
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examined these changes while the implications for security policies will be 
outlined in chapter six.
Nuclear Weapons
One of the first and most apparent global factors to have caused a
perceptual shift in security after World War II was the threat of nuclear weapons. 
Although the threat of nuclear annihilation hung over the heads of most people 
since the early 1950s it was only in the late 1960s and 1970s that a growing 
number of people began to be aware of the looming threat. By the mid 1980s it 
was evident to a vast number of people world-wide that the very survival of the 
world was in the control of the two superpowers. Never before had everyone’s 
existence been threatened by so few. In a best seller, The Fate of the Earth 
(1982), Jonathan Schell described a bleak vision of the earth following a nuclear 
war as a republic of insects and grass’:
It is often assumed that the holocaust, even if it were full-scale, 
would be restricted to the Northern Hemisphere [...] but in fact there 
is no assurance that hostilities vyould not spread to other parts of 
the world (Schell 1982, 71).
The nuclear destruction of the earth, according to Schell, would mostly be 
due to the environmental collapse brought on by a full-scale nuclear war. It is 
within this context that (in)security began to be re-examined. Shortly after 
Schell’s book the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 
(the Palme Commission) released its report Common Security: A Programme for
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Disarmament {1982). Its central theme was the prevention of nuclear war by 
means of an agenda for what the authors called Common Security. The basic 
principle proposed was that, "International security must rest on a commitment to 
joint survival rather than on a threat of mutual destruction” (independent 
Commission on Disarmament and Security Issuer 1982, xi).
During the height of the Cold War, the Commission was far-reaching in its 
recommendations and proposals from nuclear disarmament to reforming the 
United Nations. Even economic security for the Third World was among the 
recommendations. But the report consistently referred back to the threat of 
nuclear weapons and the enormous costs of the arms race. In retrospect, the 
security of the Third World seemed to be secondary to the security issues of the 
major powers:
W e are convinced that it is absolutely necessary to meet the 
security needs of the Third World by collective responsibility.
These needs are closely intertwined with efforts to safeguard 
peace and improve relations between the nuclear powers 
(Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 
1982, xi).
A key proposal in our recommendations is the 
implementation of a modified version of the UN Charter’s concept 
of collective security. Its basis would be political agreement and 
partnership between the permanent members of the Security 
Council and Third World countries. Its scope would be limited to 
Third World conflicts... (Independent Commission on Disarmament 
and Security Issues, 1982 emphasis added p. 162-163).
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Again, in retrospect, one wonders why the Palme Commission singled out Third 
World conflicts as appropriate for collective UN action and not the conflicts of the 
Northern Industrialized nations? Eurocentrlcity Is one obvious explanation.
The main point to be made is that the concept of security had begun to 
shift its priorities and its prescriptions for Implementation well before the end of 
the Cold War was even In sight. Nuclear deterrence was presented as militarily 
unstable and even as an agent of economic destabilization since it consumed so 
much energy, people, resources and dollars (Bok and Vayrynen in SIPRI 1985; 
Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982; Kaldor 
1978). "We are all in the same boat,” was the new refrain coming forward from 
all sides.
Ecology and Development
Alongside the anti-nuclear war movement was the beginnings of the
environmental movement. Like the anti-nuclear war movement that of the 
environment had its own landmark report —  Our Common Future from the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (1987). As this Commission 
pointed out, along with a large number of scientists and environmentalists, the 
environment has no boundaries; the negative effects of over-lndustrlallzatlon, 
massive military spending and poverty are local, regional and global.
In the past 20 years we have moved from awareness of Isolated 
and local Instances of environmental damage to the recognition of 
much more system-wide problems. With acid rain, global warming.
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widespread ocean pollution, and holes in the ozone loyer... (Clow,
1994, 4).
It was Increasingly apparent that ecological disaster now threatened our very 
survival on this earth; that Is, if we did not follow the plan of the Commission, or 
at least if we did not revise our concept of security to include the environment 
and development. Unlimited economic growth and the waste of resources on the 
arms race not only destabilized security but actually threatened to cause the 
collapse of the ecological system. On the regional and local level it could 
exacerbate or cause conflicts such as the struggle over scarce resources (World 
Commission on Environment and Development 1987, 291-294).
Military defense, or the acquisition of armaments, cannot resolve 
environmental problems. Nor can it help to limit or change the dominant 
development process so that it can now fit within the parameters of a 
‘sustainable development’. In fact, arms and violent conflict can only worsen 
environmental insecurity (World Commission on Environment and Development 
1987, 294-300). Witness the Gulf W ar where environmental disaster was 
commonplace, threatening the regional atmosphere, oceans and water supplies.
Social Threats
Over the past two decades the world has appeared to be shrinking —  we
can travel anywhere worldwide at any time In a matter of hours; communications 
have Improved to the point where we can watch an event anywhere on the 
planet as It is happening; and, we can communicate by phone, fax, and e-mail
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without knowing we have crossed borders. For this thesis I downloaded 
important documents from Project Ploughshares in Waterloo, ON and from the 
United Nations through one of its computers, somewhere either in New York, 
Vienna or Geneva, within minutes, and without moving from my desk.
Whether globalization can be objectively measured economically or not, 
the perception of globalization is in itself a force that is changing the concept of 
security. When we are able to watch wars as they actually take place or we are 
able to view the horrors of military rule and underdevelopment in a country half 
way around the world, our perception of (in)security is bound to change.
The impact of social, economic and political problems have more than a 
moral, ethical or perceptual impact. The impact on a global level is physical and 
tangible. It is not a coincidence that most wars are being fought in the poorest 
regions of the world. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali states it 
clearly: “Our Aims must be clear: [...] And in the largest sense, to address the 
deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political 
oppression” (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). Economic, environmental, social and military 
problems have displaced tens of millions of people, and left tens of millions 
homeless. Over one thousand million people are estimated to be destitute 
(Senarclens 1994, 441). Economic and war refugees are moving back and forth 
across borders by the hundreds of millions. They have ominous effects on 
financial and environmental and local, regional and international resources.
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Social issues, including population growth, environmental limits, food and 
energy consumption, poverty, unemployment and immigration have security 
dimensions on a global scale; “...they are already influencing the development 
and, security of communities, states and international relations as a whole” 
(Senarclens 1994, 448). And furthermore, as an example of insecurity: 
“...political strife over access to resources and their distribution will intensify in 
industrialized and poor countries alike” (Senarclens 1994, 441).
The typical armed conflict does not result from a state's ambitions 
for regional or global dominance, but from its failure to foster or 
maintain a society that can provide adequately for its own citizens, 
either for their political, social, and economic rights and interests or 
for their basic, physical needs (Project Ploughshares, 1995).
The Growing Threats of Conventional Weapons
In a sense we have gone full circle. In any discussion on traditional
security the main concept is that of national or state security being protected by 
building a strong military force, with the ultimate security umbrella being nuclear 
weapons. But as this thesis has shown, nuclear weapons are perceived more as 
actual threats to our very security both in military terms and socio-economic 
terms. Thus, the traditional security blanket must revert back to the notion of 
using conventional weapons. But this argument also has major flaws —  not 
necessarily theoretical flaws, or flaws affecting American or European 
academics, or political, and military elites who make the decisions about war. 
Rather it involved flaws for the tens of millions of refugees, millions of wounded
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civilians and those who will die. It destroys communities and states, socially, 
economically and environmentally.
Most current conflicts are fought by low-paid, or unpaid, soldiers 
equipped with light, easily obtainable weapons. ‘Small arms,’ the 
ones that do most of the killing on the planet, are relatively cheap, 
and business in small arms is still booming. In Rwanda, surely one 
of the deadliest conflicts the world has witnessed for some time, 
AK-47 assault rifles were reportedly more common than bicycles in 
1994 (Project Ploughshares, 1995).
As mentioned earlier in chapter three, small arms may well be the weapon 
of choice now and for the next few decades. The problem is that arms control, 
arms verification, arms limitation, arms agreements and disarmament measures 
are extremely difficult, if not impossible to implement because of the very nature 
of small arms. The latter are sms’!, easy to transport, and easy to produce 
(Rana 1995, 15-16). The state, especially states that are considered illegitimate 
or where the political culture perceives small arms as essential to individual 
freedom, is losing its ability to deal with the problems of small arms. These are 
not just local, state or regional issues. Small arms are crossing borders world 
wide and, maybe even more significantly, there is a strong link between small 
arms and organized international crime (Rana 1995 p.15-16).
Small arms, like nuclear weapons, have in and of themselves become 
security problems for individuals and the world. The impact of their destruction is 
immeasurable —  millions of refugees to tens of thousands are wounded, killed or 
unable to work because of landmines alone.
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Economic Threats and Globalization
The UNDP 1994 Human Development Report’s principal concern was the
peace dividend and human security. Human security, from the UNDP’s 
perspective, includes economic, food, health, environment, personal, community 
and political security —  a truly comprehensive list of security needs. In a slightly 
more detailed explanation, economic security, according to the UNDP, is defined 
as requiring “an assured basic income —  usually from productive and 
remunerative work, or in the last resort from some publicly financed safety net" 
(UNDP 1994, 25).
This definition of economic security oversimplifies and misconstrues the 
problem, however. Yes, employment and even a ‘social safety net' are essential 
for peoples’ economic well-being. Policy measures that institutionalize 
employment measures and social security protection are essential. But the 
Report’s focus on human and global security ignores the systemic problems of 
the global economic system by failing to adequately analyze what causes 
unemployment and inequality. The UNDP Report is concerned about economic 
security only in the sense that unemployment or under-employment may cause 
social or military violence —  that is, when economics impacts upon the political.
The present global capitalist economic system does not function to create 
employment and economic security for everyone equally. Rather, it is structured 
in opposition to that desired goal. Profit maximization sanctions and even
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requires the maximization of production with a minimal work force and lowest 
possible wages. Lower wages in turn can be obtained when there is a high level 
of unemployment. This may appear to be a simplistic sketch of the capitalist 
system but it represents the essentiai logic inherent in the system. It is a system 
which is not conducive to human security goals, even as outlined by the UNDP.
It is a system that thrives on competition and inequality. "Economic competition 
and conflict have taken on the very characteristics of active, slaughtering warfare 
—  from propaganda and scapegoating to the loss of lives, displacement of 
populations and the destruction of natural and built environments" (Franklin 
1996, 13). it is an understanding of the global capitalist system that the UNDP 
Report is missing and requires if it is to fully grasp the subjective and objective 
reality of global-human security.
Muiti-nationa! Corporations
To understand economic (in)security we need to address the actors
involved. The state is not the only actor in international relations. However, by 
separating politics from economics it is easy to come to this conclusion, as do 
neorealists and other academics within the field of traditional security. Yet when 
attempting to understand social economic power relations it is apparent at all 
levels that various actors and forces are at play —  it is not just the state that has 
power over international relations. There are both immutable and changeable 
forces at the global level.
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Firstly, the immutable global forces are those forces inherent in global 
ecological and even social systems. The earth’s ozone layer is the epitome of 
such a force. Its destruction would be the destruction of all society and even th? 
earth’s biosphere —  it is an inherent power that forces all individuals, societies 
and institutions to find a means to protect the ozone in order to save civilization 
as we know it. It is thus an essentially immutable relationship. Or, at the 
economic level we can say that inherent in trade at all levels, person to person or 
global, are social relations between individuals, communities or their institutions. 
Such social relations, in essence, are about power —  whether equal or unequal, 
whether fair or unfair, the existence of these relations is immutable; that is they 
cannot be gotten rid of, but their form is changeable. Thus, the second set of 
global forces are those that are imposed upon the environment by human 
activities and institutions. Changeable forces are extrinsic to ecological or social 
relations; they are imposed upon systems by societal norms, culture and beliefs. 
Destruction of the ozone is not inherent to trade relations, although on the other 
hand depletion of the ozone is an inevitable outcome of unrestrained 
industrialization. Thus, there exists a simple power relation that demonstrates 
that unrestrained industrialization has destructive power. As a global society we 
ultimately have the choice to restrain industrialization to protect the ozone or 
attempt another form of development that will not harm the ozone. Those are 
changeable relationships.
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As this thesis is concerned primarily with those economic actors and 
forces which impact upon security, I will return to that discussion. In the present 
global system, which is a global capitalist system (Petras and Polychroniou 
1995; Frank 1983; Makhijani 1991), it is apparent that corporations are one of 
the central actors that work outside the scope of the state and even use the state 
for their own purposes. Corporations, using the state as their conduit, have 
defined the international trading system. They have made the latter a system 
geared toward profit maximization and since these corporations are principally 
located in the developed world, capital automatically flows to them. Although the 
relation of dependency or exploitation has been most harsh on the Third World, 
in reality we do not have to turn to the South to see the effects of this 
relationship. There are clear examples in the Canadian context. For several 
decades Cape Breton helped fuel the Canadian economy^® with coal and steel. 
The profits of the resource extraction were withdrawn from the region, enlarging 
the profits of multinational corporations first in Britain and then in the US and 
central Canada. The region is now one of the poorest in Canada.
On a global scale the South has supplied the North with raw materials, 
food products (tea, bananas, etc.) and cheap labour. Inherent in this immutable 
relationship has been an unequal and unfair exchange. As a result, “Third World 
states suffer an acute lack of control over the international environment in which
In part Cape Breton supplied coal and steel to first the British and, later in the century, to the American 
economy.
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they must function [...]. Hence, states which are dependent on the export of 
single commodities [...] are extremely vulnerable to the workings of a mechanism 
which is completely outside their control” (Thomas 1987, 4). The state has 
regulated trade relations to ensure the corporations’ ability to develop 
international trade, and often it has used military power to enforce and impose 
those trade relations. In today’s global economy the state appears to be 
negotiating regional and global trade relations that minimize its own or other 
institutional abilities to interfere with global corporate trade. Corporations now 
make decisions largely independent of states, and these decisions directly 
impact on the social, political and economic well-being of people, determine state 
policies and set the agenda for the global monetary and trade institutions. Arun 
Makhijani judiciously describes the contemporary role and power of corporations 
in the following paragraph:
Annual sales of the largest multinational corporations total 
around $100 billion, exceeding the gross national products (GNP) 
of all but half-a-dozen Third World countries and the GNPs of many 
relatively wealthy capitalist nations as well. Moreover, banks and 
corporations have much more concentrated control over these 
sums of money than many nations do. They can generate revenue 
in hard currency, which generally is in short supply in Third World 
countries. Large portions of their holdings are liquid or can be 
converted to liquid assets. They can move capital around the world 
with the speed of an electric signal in a computer network. They 
can invest in or divest from communities and countries at a 
moment’s notice. They are responsible for the extraction of vast 
quantities of the earth’s natural resources. To a considerable 
degree they determine the prices of products around the world.
Their policies are not restrained internally or guided by the well­
being of the community or the environment. And they are 
institutionally unabashedly devoted to the pursuit of profit 
(Makhijani 1991, 187).
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The unidirectional pursuit of profits and the lack of control by the world’s 
populations and institutions over corporations is a direct threat to peoples’ and 
communities' economic security. At this level of decision making, corporations 
can determine whether or not a region, state, community or individual is worthy 
of their investment and employment. In most places around the global, at a 
moment’s notice they can reduce personal wages or delete a job, while 
individuals and communities have few, if any, economic alternatives.
Global Institutions
At the global level the economic elite, with the support of the governments
of nation states, have established world Institutions that extend corporate 
dominance on a world scale. The Bretton Woods institutions are predominantly 
controlled by the United States, Japan and Germany and thus implement policy 
primarily determined by (western) neo-liberal ideology (Thomas 1987; Petras 
and Polychroniou 1995). The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) structural 
adjustment programs not only impose and guard a neo-liberal economic agenda, 
but often foment violent political strife. Strikes, riots and rebellions have ensued 
against the harsh and even oppressive measures that have been taken in 
compliance with structural adjustment policies (Petras and Polychroniou 1995; 
Thomas 1987). For example, in the mid to late 1980s at least twenty violent 
protests were staged in Third World countries on which structural adjustment 
was imposed, resulting in over 3,000 dead (Ferraro and Rosser 1994). Petras 
and Polychroniou go on to argue “that state repression rises geometrically with
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the decline of income, and state budget cuts in health, education, and pensions" 
(Petras and Polychroniou 1995, PE-40),
Repressive policies against workers and unions are standard 
features of the structural adjustment programmes. The World Bank 
and the IMF support such anti-democratic policies. By bolstering 
compliant regimes financially and managerially they enhance their 
capacity to override popular opposition (Bjorn Beckman in Hooey 
1992, 118).
However, the effect of structural adjustment programs goes well beyond 
the fomenting of social unrest. It directly undermines the economic security of 
whole populations by further impoverishing states (Petras and Polychroniou 
1995; Thomas 1987; Ferraro and Rosser 1994). "The sobering point is that 
programs of this sort have been adopted repeatedly and have failed repeatedly” 
(Jeffrey Sachs quoted in Ferraro and Rosser 1994, 341). Social conditions in 
Third World countries have been worsened by the slash and burn policies of the 
IMF and World Bank. Structural adjustment programs prevent governments from 
investing in state infrastructure and social programs (Thomas 1987; 
Chossudovsky 1995). Yet, no country is isolated from the policies of the World 
Bank and IMF, including the developed world. For the past decade, it would 
appear that Canada has been ‘voluntarily’ implementing similar austerity 
programs for the same reasons —  debt reduction, cutting social programs, 
encouragement of foreign investment and increased exports, with pressure from 
international monetary institutions.
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These policies exacerbate rather than alleviate the debt crisis that many 
Third World (and developed) nations face. According to Ferraro and Rosser 
(1994) the debt crisis has a self-reinforcing dynamic. Money that could be used 
for increased production or increased social well-being is used to service foreign 
debts. In turn, production falls off, leading toward further indebtedness. The 
social and economic costs of the debt for many nations are debilitating and 
violent, as outlined in the following;
Money that could have been used to build schools or hospitals in 
developing countries is now going to the advanced industrialized 
countries [as interest payments]. As a consequence, fewer babies 
will survive their first year [...] Capital that could have been used to 
build factories and provide jobs is now sent abroad; as a result, the 
problem of unemployment and underemployment will only get 
worse in poor countries (Ferraro and Rosser 1994, 345, emphasis 
added).
The capitalist system is constantly in flux and expansion. The North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is an example of capital’s need to 
priorize unrestricted trade over the human need of securing employment and 
over the ability of a community or nation to choose its own economic structure 
and policies. The NAFTA enables corporations to move resources and goods 
between Canada, the US and Mexico with fewer obstacles and costs being 
placed in their way (Lai 1994).
The NAFTA was seen by indigenous leaders in Mexico as the 
continuance and deepening of ‘American imperialism’. Exacerbated by 500
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years of struggle against European and American (neo)colonialism, indigenous 
people led a rebellion in Chiapas just hours after the NAFTA came into effect 
(Lai 1994). Commandante Marcos put it candidly: “The free-trade agreement is 
a death certificate for the Indian peoples of Mexico...” (Lai 1994, 1515). Free 
trade is an instrument for ensuring the security of corporations; that is, it is 
ensures the free mobility of capital while restricting labour’s mobility.
Accordingly, it diminishes the human security needs of most people and their 
communities. Consequently, those who do not benefit from liberalized trade 
perceive the NAFTA as an injustice and as an institutionalized form of violence 
against people.
On a global scale a small economic elite benefit from its institutions, 
corporations and, through control of international governing institutions and 
nation states, they are able to set national laws, international norms and 
agreements that accommodate their interests. To protect these institutions, 
security has been defined and operationalized in terms that protect the nation 
state and its governing elite —  which are actually controlled by corporations and 
their owners. But, when we begin to perceive security from the perspective of 
the majority of people —  the poor and marginalized, women, non-European, —  
economic and social justice become interchangeable with the concept of 
security.
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Militarism
Marilyn V '̂aring (1988) gives an excellent overview of the development of 
the orthodox measures used to determine economic growth. She outlines the 
relationship between our current system of economic measurement and 
militarism. The creation of the GNP as a measure between 1939 and 1943 by 
Keynes, Stone and Gilbert was essentially a system to help pay for the war. A 
1939 paper co-authored by John Maynard Keynes and Richard Stone entitled 
The National Income and Expenditure of the United Kingdom, and Howto Pay 
for the W ar, set the stage for further development by Milton Gilbert of our present 
day national accounting system. “But Gilbert’s purpose and economic problem 
was 'how to pay for the war’. He strongly supported the use of the GNP as the 
proper measure in analyzing the economic relationship between defence 
expenditure and total cutpuf’ (Waring 1988, 56 original emphasis). Thus, as 
Waring properly points out, “national income estimates everywhere, to this day, 
[are] an assessment of how best to pay for the war" (Waring 1988, 56-57, 
original emphasis).
The ‘military industrial complex’ still permeates all sectors of society. In 
fact, the US economy is heavily over-dependent on military expenditure 
(Galbraith 1992). World military expenditure has dropped tiom almost a trillion 
dollars per year in 1987 to only $767 billion per year in 1994. Most of this
Waring’s main argument is that the United Nation's standards of economic measurement are biased 
against women, the poor, the marginaiized and the ecosystem.
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decrease is due to the collapse oi the military economy of the former USSR  
(Commission on World Governance 1995). The US, while cutting costs, has 
Improved the ‘killing and maiming-efflciency’ of its armed forces through 
modernization (McMurty 1991).
Militarism Is first and foremost an ideology that espouses the belief that 
political violence is legitimate and even necessary. But militarism is also 
reflected in the structure of the world economic system. It is associated with 
authoritarian and repressive governments, which have massive military 
capabilities. A large segment of society, Including its resources, finances and 
people are geared toward maintaining the military system. The Third World’s 
largest source of armaments Is the industrialized North. Since the end of the 
Cold War, the US has become by far the leading arms exporter to the Third 
World. On top of supplying arms to the South, tne industrialized North, in 
particular the US, has helped to install military regimes in the Third World and 
provided them with political and economic support (Forsythe 1992).
If a country develops an economic system that is based on how to 
pay for the war, and if the amounts of fixed capital Investments that 
are apparent are tied up in armaments, and if that country is a 
major exporter of arms and Its Industrial fabric is dependent on 
them, then It would be in that country’s interests to ensure that It 
always has a market. It Is not an exaggeration to say that it is 
clearly in the interests o f the world’s leading arms exporters to 
make sure there is always a war going on somewhere (Waring 
1987, 170, emphasis added).
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On the other hand, the standard UN indicators of economic growth leave out 
poverty, unemployment, starvation, war and even death as insignificant factors in 
the global capitalist system.
The military system exploits massive amounts of resources, energy and 
people. Essentially, the military system is much less productive than a civilian 
sector. Civilian production and services create more jobs and produce end 
products that are used for further production and reproduction. The military 
system is inflationary and unstable since it is a supply controlled industry. Under 
the auspices of national security, governments will spend immense amounts to 
get the military components or hardware they want, often at the expense of 
social programs. As for technical spin-offs from military research, it is ultimately 
more effective to spend money directly on civil research and technology rather 
than wait for the trickle down effects —  which, if they come, are often small and 
insignificant to the real issues facing communities and individuals (Luckham 
1978; Kaldor 1978; Dumas 1990).
More recent empirical studies show that the relationship between 
armament expenditures and economic growth is a negative one (Ball 1988;
Deger 1986; Faini et. al. 1984; Mintz and Stevenson 1995; Abell 1994). A 
study by Julia Kwong and Zachary Zimmer analyzing modernization and 
dependency theories of development concluded:
Like dependency theorists, we have to conclude that arms imports
hurt social development, the creation of an indigenous military
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infrastructure does not necessarily benefit a nation, and that a 
nation is likely to gain from these programs when its military 
complex is capable of producing arms for sale to other countries 
[...] —  increased militarization among the developing nations will 
damage their social development (Kwong and Zimmer 1995, 78).
Nicole Ball (1988) argues that economic development requires an 
equitable distribution of resources and a political system that enables various 
sectors to articulate their needs, but “[t]he greater the political power of the 
armed forces, the less likely it is that these requirements will be met" (Ball 1988, 
391). Unfortunately, instead of securing the well-being of people, armed forces 
have shown more interest in expanding their own economic and political power 
(Ball 1988).
Economic Security
This thesis attempts to demonstrate that traditional security studies
perspectives, including the established neo-realist and idealist/internationalist, 
fail to adequately explain the relationship between economics and security for 
the majority of the world’s population. Traditional security studies see security 
from the view-point of a dominant class (essentially an interlocking global 
economic, political and military elite). Historically, this dominant class has been 
confined to the nation state, but in recent history, technology, corporate 
expansion and international institutions have globalized this class of corporate 
owners, political and institutional managers and military elites.
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Security, if properly understood, must be viewed from the perspective of 
the majority of the world's people. The protection of the nation state is not the 
prime goal of the non-elite. Economic security, the right to employment and an 
equitable livelihood is what determines the fate of most people. Essentially 
security is freedom from oppression and exploitation. From this perspective 
economics and security interweave and do not have to, as Ayoob argues, 
threaten "political outcomes that either affect the survivability of state boundaries, 
state institutions, or governing elites or weaken the capacity of sates and 
regimes to act effectively in the realm of both domestic and international politics” 
(Ayoob 1995, 9). Ayoob’s perspective is of interest, but It represents the security 
interest of the global ruling class which is predominantly white, male and 
European. From an equitable global-human security perspective, security is 
about ensuring the interests of the marginalized, the poor, women, non-white —  
in other words the vast majority of the world’s population. Ensuring our security 
has very little to do with boundaries or state institutions, in fact, present 
institutions —  corporations, military regimes. Bretton Woods institutions, neo­
colonial structures, even the sovereign state as it is presently constituted —  are 
what undermine the economic and social security of most people.
The present global capitalist system in conjunction with global militarism 
not only tolerates conditions of inequality, mass deprivation, mass poverty and 
mass insecurity; it thrives on such unacceptable conditions. While millions of 
people suffer directly from the consequences of war, everyday even more people
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suffer and die from the structural violence of global capitalism and militarism —  
homelessness, hunger, starvation and social violence. As a poignant example, 
over 15 million children die each year from poverty and it can be shown that it is 
capitalism that keeps these children (one billion people in all) in absolute poverty 
(Paul Elins in Petras & Polychroniou 1995, PE-38).
Defining Global-human Security
Using the above described threats and the emerging processes of
globalization as outlined above this section will provide distinct definitions for 
both global security and human security as separate but compatible ‘new’ 
security concepts. Used together they form the basics for a comprehensive 
security system.
With these major developments as just outlined, it is no surprise that we 
have been beset with yet another commission dealing with the state of the earth. 
And with the end of the Cold W ar it is no surprise that once again security is a 
key issue. Our Global Neiabourhood. the Report of the Commission on Global 
Governance (1995), states that, “The security of people recognizes that global 
security extends beyond the protection of borders, ruling elites, and exclusive 
state interests to include the protection of people. It does not exclude military 
threats from the security agenda” (Commission on Global Governance 1995, 81).
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It is important to note that this latest report, Our Global Neiabourhood. has 
taken us a step further and beyond the notion of common security/^ It is not just 
with the common security of states that the report concerns itself when making 
recommendations. It is, as well, and importantly so, concerned with the common 
security of people. This is a step in tf e right direction toward recognizing 
changing power in the global system as outlined above. As one of its proposed 
international norms it recommends that milita;y force not be recognized as a 
legitimate political instrument, yet it adds the following proviso: “except as self- 
defense or under UN auspices” (Commission on Global Governance 1995, 85).
As a report it makes a compromise between what ought to exist and what 
the commission believes is realistic. This might explain the above exception and 
why the report mentions the concepts of comprehensive security and human 
security but then proceeds to imply that these are noble but not necessarily 
realistic. Here is what it states just before putting these two concepts to the side:
[Collective security] is inherently military focused. Comprehensive 
security, on the other hand, emphasizes changing the present 
military-based notion of security. Among its dominant ideas are 
cooperation, confidence-building, transparency, gradual 
disarmament, conversion, demobilization, and demilitarization. 
Recently a new concept —  human security —  has received 
attention. This is a people centred approach that is concerned not 
so much with weapons as with basic human dignity. As explained 
in the Human Development Report 1994. human security includes 
safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and 
repression, as well as protection from sudden and harmful
IB For a complete definition of the term 'common security' see Palme (1982). It is in this report that the term 
was first popularized.
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disruptions in the patterns of daily life (Commission on Global 
Governance 1995, 80).
As a practical political tool to support change, the report may be crucial in 
moving governments forward in adopting new approaches to security. But as a 
discussion on security issues the report fails to fully recognize the importance of 
the two concepts, comprehensive and human security. When it calls on 
governments to renounce force "except as self-defense or under UN auspices,” it 
ultimately falls into the same old mold of traditional security. The global factors 
outlined in the previous sections of this chapter are real insecurities and cannot 
be fixed with force whether it be state-centred or a global force. A forceful 
response is apt to intensify some of the very problems it was meant to resolve. 
The Gulf W ar is a good example. Iraq, the aggressor country, invaded and 
occupied Kuwait. The traditional security response was to gang up and forcefully 
remove the Iraqi military from Kuwait. Within the guidelines of the report this 
ought to be done under the auspices of the UN. For the most part this is what 
actually happened, although officially it was only supported by the UN under an 
American lead coalition force which defended Kuwait from invasion. From the 
traditional security perspective the war was a success, pushing back Iraq and 
reducing its military power. Yet, from an approach that “includes the security of 
people and the planet" (Commission on Global Governance 1995, 78) the Gulf 
W ar was an indisputable disaster: leaving an estimated 100,000, or more, dead; 
as many if not more wounded, tens of thousands of refugees; economic
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destruction of infrastructure and trade systems devastated in two countries; 
environmental disasters with oil spills and burning oil wells; and last, the fact that 
a brutal dictatorship continues in Iraq and an oppressive autocracy is well 
entrenched in the liberated nation of Kuwait.
Comprehensive and human security concepts are essentially normative 
and prescriptive in nature, but they are, as well, responses to real insecurities 
that affect all of us. These insecurities, as outlined above, demand more than 
the traditional military response because 1) the military is unable to resolve the 
problems; 2} a violent response may exacerbate and create greater problems; 
and 3) armament build-ups are an insecurity in and of themselves.
Global Security
Global security, then, is distinct from common security in that it perceives 
military force to be antithetical to security interests. The military industrial 
complex is a threat to society as is the build-up of nuclear and even conventional 
weapons. The fundamental threats facing nation states and the people of the 
world derive from social, economic and environmental problems. These threats 
cannot be dealt with using the traditional military response and indeed will only 
be exacerbated by such a response. Global security not only requires global 
political, social, ecological and economic responses; it is all of these.
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Human Security
Human security on the other hand approaches security from the
perspective of individuals and their community, it is a micro orientation which 
places emphasis on the socio-economic well-being of people. It is a form of 
security which assumes that people are the centre of security policies and not 
the nation state. It is compatible with and inherent in global security. Yet, it still 
does not encompass the broader range of factors of global-human security, 
portrayed in figure 2 below.
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Global-human Security
I use the two terms, global and human, together since they are more
descriptive of the security paradigm that is emerging, as outlined in this thesis. 
Comprehensive security does not reflect the duality of the system as presented 
here; thus I reject the term. The emerging security paradigm has both global and 
individual dimensions, it is both micro and macro oriented, and it is multi­
dimensional —  social, economic, cultural, gendered and political.
Peacekeeping as it is practiced within the framework of the traditional 
security paradigm is but one policy oriented toward preventing and stopping 
armed conflict. The following chapter will re-evaluate generic peacekeeping from 
a global-human security paradigm perspective Obviously, based on the above 
definitions the guidepost for such an evaluation are a durable long-term security 
that protects individuals from armed-conflict and structural violence. Moreover, it 
starts with the proposition that security is non-military and concerned with 
sweeping global economic and ecological issues.
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PART H — PEACEKEEPING
Chapter 5 
Making the Peace
Peacekeeping in its generic form has been a central policy tool of the UN 
for forty years as a means to deal with inter- and intra-national conflicts. Using 
the above discussion on how security has shifted theoretically and in real terms 
this chapter will present a broad theoretical assessment of peacekeeping.
Firstly, this chapter starts by defining the various peacekeeping concepts —  
peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, enforcement and 
warmaking, and peacebuilding. These concepts will be used throughout this 
section. Secondly, this chapter will continue with a brief historical overview of 
peacekeeping. Thirdly, it will present a brief review of the literature showing that 
peacekeeping has been mostly, if not only, assessed from a traditional military 
perspective with the emphasis on meeting technical and policy goals. A more 
theoretical and normative assessment has been virtually ignored as has the 
global and human security perspective. Thus, the chapter will end with a broad 
comparative theoretical assessment and review of peacekeeping.
Defining the Peacekeeping Concepts
Peacekeeping
The concept ‘peacekeeping’ has both a generic and a specific functional 
meaning. Generically it refers to any action undertaken by the UN or a regional
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alliances to prevent, maintain or instill ‘peace’ between conflicting parties 
(Epstein in Jacobson ef. al. 1994). In this instance, it can refer to almost 
anything from the Gulf War to the UN’s role in rebuilding a political system in 
Cambodia. This author believes that such a broad use of the term is unfortunate 
and at times harmful since it is used as a propaganda tool to soften the impact of 
what is in effect war. Using military force to coerce differing parties to resolve an 
issue (for example: the Gulf War or NATO bombings in the former Yugoslavia) is 
not an act of peace, it is an act of state violence or war.
In its more precise and specific meaning, however, peacekeeping refers 
to a specific operation or action taken by military and/or police personnel under 
the auspices of the UN, who are lightly armed for strictly defensive purposes 
only, and whose purpose is to supervise or maintain peace agreements with 
support from the conflicting parties (Epstein Jacobson et. al. 1994, 100; Diehl 
1994, 13; Boutros-Ghali 1992). In more recent missions non-military personnel, 
particularly non-government organizations (NGOs) have played more prominent 
roles.
As the mandate of peacekeeping broadens a threshold is crossed where 
the operation can no-longer be classified as peacekeeping In the specific sense 
just described. The following concepts outline the various forms of generic 
(interrelated) peacekeeping, helping to distinguish a variety of actions.
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operations and processes that are profoundly different from each other in the 
post-Cold W ar era.
Preventive diplomacy and Peacemaking
Preventive diplomacy includes those actions taken to “...prevent disputes
from arising between parties, to prevent disputes frc": escalating into conflicts 
and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur” (Boutrcs-Ghali, 1992). In 
Boutros-Ghali’s report An Agenda for Peace (1992), preventive diplomacy is 
defined to include fact-finding missions, early warning systems, preventive 
deployment of personnel, and the creation of demilitarized zones. It can include 
using official diplomats, representatives of the UN and otner global state bodies, 
and individuals and institutions of civil society.
Peacemaking \z an agreed method of resolving international disputes or, 
at the very least, the negotiating by conflicting parties to cease hostilities. In 
either case, it is a process of peaceful settlement. The most obvious and central 
tool for a peaceful settlement is mediation and negotiation which can effectively 
involve an impartial third party including another state, the United Nations, non­
government organizations, or even the World Court as an arbitrator of disputes. 
In An Agenda for Peace it is suggested that economic and organizational 
assistance could ameliorate the conditions that have caused the dispute or 
conflict in the first place. As well, the report suggests that military and economic 
sanctions and collective military force may be useful tools in the peacemaking
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process. These latter actions go beyond the bounds of peacemaking to 
encompass enforcement and warmaking, below.
Enforcement and Warmaking
Enforcement measures and actions are undertaken with or without the
consent of the conflicting parties involved and are used to restore international, 
regional or national peace. Military or economic sanctions, whether imposed by 
states or the UN, are used to coerce a state or group to succumb to an 
international norm or demand. Again, in this case civil society can take a limited 
role in imposing economic or political enforcement (the international boycott 
against apartheid South Africa was in part organized by international NGOs),
This type of action can essentially be called non-military enforcement to help 
distinguish it from the types of peacekeeping or peacemaking initiatives 
described above.
Another step that the UN is authorized to take under Articles 41 and 42 of 
the UN Charter is what is sometimes referred to as ‘peace-enforcement’. This 
involves the use of military force to impose sanctions, embargoes or a peace 
agreement (Epstein in Jacobson et. al. 1994, 101). The types of action taken in 
Somalia or the former Yugoslavia fall within this category since, under the 
auspices of the UN, limited military force was used to pacify one or more sides in 
the conflict (Holmes 1993, 329) and the agreement of all parties was not first 
solicited. This type of action would best be called military enforcement as
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distinct from non-military enforcement. Civil society does not have the means or 
the ability to participate in this type of action or in the following.
The last type of action that can be taken by the UN is indistinguishable 
from war. The Gulf W ar and Korean War clearly fall into this category. They are 
essentially International collective actions to repress an ‘aggressor’ and force 
them to accept an agreement. Kim Holmes (1993, 329), a neo-realist, uses the 
term warmaking to refer to this type of action. It is distinct from military 
enforcement since the military action in this case is not limited to strategic 
bombings’ or other 'strategic actions’ Warmaking uses full military force to 
compel an enemy to submit to an agreement. For example, in the Gulf War, Iraq 
was clearly viewed as the enemy, whereas in the former Yugoslavia there is no 
clear enemy and therefore limited force was used for ‘self-defence’ of 
peacekeepers and to enforce specific requirements.
Peacebuilding
Peacebuilding, as used in An Agenda For Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1993) is 
the counterpart to preventive diplomacy. In this instance, peacebuilding refers to 
the reconstruction of political, social and economic institutions that will enhance a 
lasting peace and sense of confidence, following a conflict. It can include such 
measures as disarming the warring parties, repatriation of refugees, monitoring 
elections, reforming government institutions by promoting political participation, 
and protecting human rights (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). These various activities can
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be done prior to the outbreak of hostilities to help lay the foundations for trust, 
confidence and even potential power sharing. Peacebuilding in its more narrow 
sense refers to an action and does not have to be implemented following a 
conflict; it may precede the conflict in an effort to reduce already existing tension. 
Yet, peacebuilding in it broader sense is an ongoing process that can and should 
be conflated with development. At this level peacebuilding is more than 
reconstruction, it is about building political and economic structures which 
address the underlying causes of war and structural violence.
Peacekeeping: A Historical Introduction
Cold War Peacekeeping
The first official peacekeeping mission was a response to the Suez Crisis
in 1956. Lester B. Pearson is credited for having been the brain behind the 
precedent-setting peacekeeping mission that responded to the Suez crisis. For 
his actions he received the Nobel Peace Prize. The United Nations Emergency 
Force (UNEF) monitored a buffer zone between Egypt and Israel and monitored 
the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli forces. Like many of the other 
peacekeeping missions during the Cold War, not only did this mission help to 
stop a regional war, it found a way to keep the USSR and the US from getting 
involved, and thereby preventing the escalation of the conflict (Durch 1993b, 7- 
9). Prior to 1956, three missions led by the UN did not involve a UN military 
force monitoring a peace agreement or cease-fire. These missions were either 
investigative teams or observer groups with a mandate only to report their
Peter Coombes Peacetimes or Wartimes Page 79
findings. Strictly speaking, these would not be labeled peacekeeping as defined 
above, but they are the precursors leading up to the 1956 mission.
Including the three observer missions of 1947 to 1950, in total the UN 
organized 13 peacekeeping operations during the Cold W ar period. The only 
mission during this time which escalated from peacekeeping to an attempt to 
enforce a mandate was that in the Congo in 1960. The mission was initially 
implemented to help restore law and order and to assist in the withdrawal of 
Belgian forces. But as internal politics and civil strife increased, it was caught in 
the middle and the reaction by the UN force was to intervene directly in the 
internal affairs of the Congo (Diehl 1994, 50-51). "It set a potential precedent for 
coercive UN operations elsewhere, but the political trauma caused led many in 
the UN to view it as ‘the UN’s Vietnam,’ as an experience never to be repeated” 
(Durch 1993b, 8).
During this period a classical example of peacekeeping would include the 
Cyprus mission which was similar to the Congo in political terms but had a very 
different outcome (Diehl 1994, 53). Lightly armed military personnel were sent to 
restore law and order and to prevent further fighting. For ten years the operation 
managed to control and de-escalate several crises (Diehl 1994, 53). In 1974, 
following a coup and the Turkish invasion of the northern half of the country, a 
cease-fire was quickly agreed to and the role of the UN peacekeepers changed. 
Now they were to monitor a buffer zone within a divided Cyprus (Diehl 1994, 54-
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55), At all times the UN peacekeeping forces refrained from military action and 
acted as an impartial third party between Greek and Turkish Cyprus,
Post-Cold War Peacekeeping
The most dramatic change in the past 40 years of peacekeeping was
precipitated by the end of the Cold W ar which has profoundly changed how the 
UN —  the Security Council in particular —  makes key decisions. In 1956, the 
United Nations General Assembly responded to the Suez crisis by sending an 
impartial, lightly armed force to the region to help separate opposing sides. By 
contrast, following the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council authorized 
the use of any and all means deemed necessary to oust Iraq from an occupied 
Kuwait, A US-led coalition then launched the largest collective military action 
since World War II. In the former Yugoslavia, UN peacekeepers are responsible 
for protecting ‘safe-zones’ and NATO forces have bombed Serbian positions to 
help protect these zones and to encourage peace talks, ultimately leading to the 
Dayton Peace Agreement.
Since the later part of the 1980s, the role of the UN in dealing with violent 
conflict has broadened and expanded to cover a multitude of actions from 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding to non-military enforcement and even war. In 
total, in 1994, the UN was actively involved in twenty-eight conflicts around the 
world, nine of which were, according to Boutros-Ghali (1995), classical 
peacekeeping operations, eight of which were considered multi-functional
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peacekeeping, and another eleven were preventive-diplomacy/peacemaking 
missions.
The number of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peacemaking and UN 
enforcement operations has dramatically increased: 21 missions were 
established from 1988 to 1994. In just six years this is almost double the number 
established during the first 40 years of the UN. As well, the number of military 
personnel involved increased almost eight-fold, from 9,570 in 1988 to 73,393 in 
1994. And the overall budget for the various peacekeeping to peacebuilding 
operations increased from US $230 million in 1988 to $3,610 million in 1994 
(Boutros-Ghali 1995).
Probably more important is the fact that most of the new conflicts involving 
the UN are intra- rather than inter-state wars. For example, of the 11 UN 
operations established from January 1992 to January 1994, nine were related to 
intra-state conflicts and only two were inter-state wars (Boutros-Ghali 1995).
The new breed of intra-state conflicts have certain characteristics 
that present United Nations peace-keepers with challenges not 
encountered since the Congo operation of the early 1960s. They 
are usually fought not only by regular armies but also by militias 
and armed civilians with little discipline and with ill-defined chains of 
commands. They are often guerrilla wars without clear front lines 
(Boutros-Ghali 1995).
It has been suggested that since the end of the Cold W ar the UN is now 
free to do what it was originally designed to do —  that is, to use its collective
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security abilities to resolve international disputes (Epstein in Jacobson e t al. 
1994, 98). Tlie broadened and expanded role of the UN in international disputes 
suggests it just may be trying to fulfill that role. Thus, at this time of transitions it 
seems important to reconsider the role of UN involvement in international 
disputes. Not only should we be asking when and how, but also to what end 
should the UN be involved? In terms of global-human security, we need to ask: 
what is the role of the UN and why is it or should it be doing peacekeeping?
Peacekeeping Literature
The assessment of peacekeeping and other UN involvement in
international conflicts, whether critical or positive, has been done mostly, if not 
exclusively, from the perspective of traditional security. Most studies of 
peacekeeping, in its general form, have looked a. only one peacekeeping 
mission and have attempted to generalize the findings. And the few studies that 
cover many operations are often historical and descriptive and provide little or no 
analysis (Diehl 1993a, 3). Paul Diehl states that his book is one of the few to 
provide a theoretical analysis of why and how peacekeeping operations are 
successful. The question that Diehl proposes to answer is: “What are the 
conditions under which peacekeeping operations are successful in maintaining 
cease-fire arrangements and in promoting resolution of the underlying conflict 
between the protagonists?” (Diehl 1993a, 3). Diehl’s analysis is not so different 
in orientation from William Durch’s encyclopedic assessment of all such UN 
operations from 1947 to 1993, in his The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (Durch,
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1993b), Both are excellent approaches to the study of UN peacekeeping and 
reaffirm some widely held notions; for example, that to be successful UN 
operations need the support of the major powers, and have worked best when 
they are essentially impartial. But neither book provides the necessary 
theoretical framework for questioning the very basis of generic peacekeeping.
Other assessments have focused on whether it should be the UN or a 
regional grouping or even individual states that should or need to be involved in 
resolving international disputes (Holmes 1993; Black and Rolston 1995; Fromuth 
1993). Yet other assessments focus primarily on the actual field operations 
(Black and Rolston 1995). It appears that few attempt to approach the 
assessment from the perspective of a more general theoretical discussion; 
however, even Diehl, who attempts to do so, fails to put his discussion into the 
context of international relations theory or the theoretical literature on security.
One of the more far-reaching and most recent studies on peacekeeping 
by A.B. Featherstone (1994) successfully argues that UN peacekeeping should 
be assessed and implemented from a contingency model. Featherstone’s 
contingency model is based on a study by Fisher and Keashly (1991). The latter 
argue for a pragmatic approach to peacekeeping which is based on third party 
conflict resolution.
It is surmised then that intervention types such as mediation, which 
focus on objective elements of conflict, will be more effective at 
certain points in the conflict; and intervention types such as 
consultation, which focus more on subjective elements of a conflict,
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will be more effective at other points. Furthermore, the utilization of 
different methods at different points in the conflict can be 
interrelated. Fisher and Keashly call this ‘complementarity’.
Working within a contingency approach, then, means utilizing an 
appropriate intervention strategy which has been shown to be 
most effective at particular points in a conflict process 
(Featherstone 1994, 115-116).
Diehl and Featherstone ultimately fail to address the broad theoretical view 
because they are working within the confines of the traditional security 
perspective. It is essentially assumed by them that when speaking of security 
we are referring to the security of the state and the prevention of military conflict 
Robert Cox (1981) argues that there are two levels of theory: 1) problem-solving 
theory, and 2) Critical Theory l^roblem-solvlng theory takes the world as it is 
and tries to make the relationships and institutions work smoothly. This is what 
Diehl and Featherstone do. They offer a pragmatic approach that attempts to 
reform the UN and peacekeeping, as such. This is a useful and necessary area 
of study.
This thesis, however, is an attempt to go beyond the assumptions of the 
traditional security paradigm. Featherstone’s assessment of peacekeeping is 
probably the most conducive to the global-human security paradigm. His 
approach, although problem-solving in its orientation, is flexible enough to adjust 
to the human and global aspects of security. A contingency theory fits well with 
the broad theoretical concerns of critical theory as outlined by Cox:
Critical theory, unlike problem-solving theory, does not take 
institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls 
them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how
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and whether they might be in the process of changing. It is 
directed towards an appraisal of the very framework for action, or 
problematic, which probk m-solving theory accepts as its 
parameters. Critical theory is directed to the social and political 
complex as a whole rather than to the separate parts (Cox 1981,
129).
Using the above discussion on security, the last section of this chapter will 
assess from an international critical theory perspective the various forms of UN 
involvement in international disputes. The question posed is: are the various 
forms of UN involvement in international conflict meeting the security needs of 
the traditional paradigm or the global-human paradigm?
Evaluating Peacekeeping
Table 2 below presents a quick visual overview of the differences between
the traditional and the global-human security paradigms. Each has very different 
criteria and assumptions in their respective definitions and assessments of the 
various types of peacekeeping. Within the global-human security paradigm it is 
clear that peacekeeping policies should be limited and must be placed within a 
more holistic development process. The traditional paradigm assesses 
peacekeeping policies in terms of fragmented functional end-goals.
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Table 2  Evaluating peacekeeping
PoacebuUtfing
T ra d itio n a i S ecu rity  
" ' ' garaciigiB
1. w a r reconstruction
2. elections monitoring, building 
infrastructures, etc. for the purpose  
of maintaining a cease-fire or a  
peace agreem ent and preventing  
relapse into violent conflict.
â lo b a irh u m a »  S aeu rfty
1. long-term peace process, 
addresses politico-economic  
insecurity before, during and after 
conflict
2, is conflated with sustainable, 
dem ocratic and equitable  
developm ent — for the purpose o f 






1. prevent military action
2. build diplomatic relations
3. arm s control agreem ents
4. w ork toward economic and  
social ties to  prevent arm ed conflict
1. p revent military action
2. build diplom atic relations
3. com plete nuclear d isarm am ent 
and w ork toward conventional 
disarm am ent
4. w ork toward econom ic and 
social ties that build the foundations  
for peacebuilding process
Peacekaapfng 1. military action
2. end goal is to separate arm ed  
com batants
3. functional assessm ent
4. term s of reference: m andate, 
end o f hostilities, cease-fire  or 
p eace agreem ent.
1. non-military action
2. end goal is to separate  arm ed  
forces to prepare for peacebuilding
3. functional assessm ent
4. term s o f reference: m andate, 
end o f hostilities followed by a long­




1. military and non-military force  
used to coerce conditions on one ur 
m ore parties.
1. non-military force used to 
coerce conditions on one o r m ore  
parties
2. military enforcem ent is not an  
acceptable option
Warmaking 1. the use o f military force and 
coercion are  part o f a  continuum  of 
politics
1. Not an option —  the use of 
military force and coercion are  
deem ed the failure o f politics
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Peacekeeping Assessment
From the traditional security perspective, UN peacekeeping operations
during the Cold W ar can be viewed as a means to prevent regional armed 
conflicts from escalating into conflicts that would involve the two superpowers 
(Durch 1993b). From this perspective all the operations at that time successfully 
kept the US and the USSR out of several conflicts, including the Congo, Cyprus 
and even the Suez crisis. Another aspect would essentially be that such 
missions now and during the Cold W ar are collective security measures that 
support the interests of the major powers. The UN is acting merely as their 
proxy. This would explain why realists are often very cautious about UN 
involvement in such operations. Kim Holmes (1993, 338) argues that 
peacekeeping^® can work under certain circumstances but the US needs 
guidelines to protect its interests:
The United States should, in this regard, be sensitive to three 
variables; (1) how a peacekeeping operation affects American 
national security, (2) how much it costs; and (3) the degree to 
which it erodes American sovereignty {Ho\mes 1993, 338, 
emphasis added).
Peacekeeping from such a traditional perspective is merely another type 
of military power on a continuum that starts with politics and e ids with war, as 
shown in figure 3, below.
Kim Holmes (1993, 338) is using the term peacekeeping in broader terms than the above definition would 
allow.
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Military and Poactbuildlrtg
dlpWmmcy & Peacekeeping non-military Warmaking {war
paaeamaklmg enforcement reconatructlon)
From this perspective the purpose of peacekeeping is: I) to limit the amount of 
military force used; ii) to reduce the number of actors involved; iii) to protect the 
interests of the larger and more influential states; and, iv) to prevent the conflict 
from escalating into a more generalized conflict. From a more liberal or idealist 
perspective the erosion of state-power is acceptable, even preferable, as long as 
it is replaced by a collective military force and is intended to prevent a larger 
conflict. Again, the purpose remains to limit the conflict between specific parties 
and to protect greater international interests from local violence. A peace 
agreement, which is often brokered by the major powers, is necessary to 
maintain stability.
[T]he basic conditions for success remain unchanged: a clear and 
practicable mandate; the cooperation of the parties in implementing 
that mandate; the continuing support of the Security Council; the 
readiness of Member States to contribute the military, police and 
civilian personnel [...]; and adequate financial and logistic support 
(Boutros-Ghali, 1992).
This, pragmatic, specific, short-term agreement is in contrast to the global- 
human security paradigm which perceives military conflict at such a stage as 
indicating the failure of the international system to deal with the underlying 
problems that caused the conflict in the first instance. Peacekeeping is, from this
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perspective, not just a means to limit conflict but it is seen as the 'last ditch’ effort 
to help regain the space necessary to work toward rebuilding the confidence 
needed for a lasting peace agreement. A lasting peace is the necessary goal to 
protect people from the horrors of war.
From the perspective of the global-human security paradigm, most 
peacekeeping operations to date have had only a minimum amount of success. 
They have helped to stop or prevent the immediate hostilities but few have been 
able to provide the conditions necessary to build a lasting peace. Such a 
criticism is not meant to undermine the necessity of peacekeeping because 
without it many conflicts in the past could have had much worse outcomes. Yet, 
peacekeeping must be used in conjunction with other tools that help maintain 
peace, establish confidence-building measures and erode the causes of war. At 
a functional level Featherstone’s problem-solving framework using a theory of 
contingency conflict diplomacy would work best. It offers an assessment of 
peacekeeping essentially from a non-military perspective. Within the global- 
human security paradigm, prevention, not peacekeeping, is viewed as the central 
issue. Peacekeeping is but one technique that can be used in an ongoing 
process of building a iasting and just peace.
Enforcement and Warmaking Assessment
In contrast to peacekeeping, which depends on the explicit participation of
all parties involved, is enforcement and warmaking. From the traditional security
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paradigm enforcement and warmaking are forms of collective security which 
states use to ensure their national security. These types of actions, whether 
non-military or military in orientation, can be very useful tools in forcing an 
'aggressor' to abide by international norms or perceived national interests. The 
type of action to be used in enforcement is determined by strategic military and 
political interests and is part of a continuum of potential actions —  with non- 
military sanctions and embargoes at one end and military blockades and war at 
the other. As an example, applying sanctions is the first tool used to put 
economic and social pressure on a government. If the sanctions appear not to 
be working then military force will be used if it is strategically advisable. The Gulf 
W ar is an example of this thinking. Sanctions were applied against Iraq as 
punishment and as an ‘incentive’ to withdraw from Kuwait. Within a short time it 
was decided that sanctions were not working (although this is highly debatable); 
thus a war against Iraq was determined to be necessary and feasible. From the 
traditional security perspective, together, the war and military-sanctions were 
considered, for the most part, highly successful. Iraq was forced to withdraw 
from Kuwait and its military power was decisively reduced ensuring that Iraq 
would not be a threat to Middle East security. “Collateral damage” for the US-led 
coalition was very low. It is also cited as a UN collective security success.
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Another example of post-cold war peacekeeping is the “peace force" that 
was sent to S o m a l i a . E v e n  from the perspective of the traditional security 
paradigm this represented a failed mission. The specifics of why it failed have 
been argued back and forth by many political and military writers, but ultimately 
the arguments are that the political conditions were not right and/or that the right 
type of military action was not taken. Lynn Davis suggests that the prospect for 
other such humanitarian actions is most uncertain but she does not rule out 
military action. “Ultimately, the international community can use military force. 
Military forces are, however, extremely blunt instruments of policy. Their use will 
not be successful without clear goals..." (Davis 1993, 28).
Another concern is whether or not the UN has the legitimacy to undertake 
enforcement, especially in cases that involve internal disputes. This relates 
mainly to the composition of the Security Council and UN controls and demand 
structures (Pearson in Black 1995,171).  Again this reflects the ongoing 
concerns of national sovereignty. But these issues could be resolved by 
restructuring the Security Council and other UN bodies (Pearson in Black 1995).
From’a global-human security perspective the concern about UN 
legitimacy has more to do with its ability to represent people as opposed to 
states. Moreover, from this perspective enforcement action in general is very
The Somalia Operation began, more or less, as a traditional UN peacekeeping operation but was 
transformed by American “intervention". It was mandated as a humanitarian endeavour and later actions, 
such as trying to arrest Aideed, transformed the mission into an enforcement action.
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much frowned upon and is perceived in general to be illegitimate since it is the 
security of people that is threatened by such actions. Non-military enforcement 
actions are the preferred tool in times of crisis. Economic, political and cultural 
embargoes can be used to mount pressure on governments to accept 
international norms. Such sanctions as imposed against apartheid South Africa 
are prime examples of when such action can be successfully undertaken.
As an example, from a global-human security perspective the Gulf War 
was a disaster. It cost the lives of estimates ranging from 100,000 to 200,000  
people. It left tens of thousands homeless and it was very difficult for the world 
to respond to the massive growth in refugees along the Iraq border. Security in 
the region remains very unstable for many people. The environment was left in 
ruins in Kuwait by Iraqi and coalition forces. And the economic infrastructure of 
Iraq was destroyed. Kuwait is still ruled by an elite family monarchy and Iraq is 
ruled by a brutal oligarchy.
From a global-human security perspective, then, war failed to resolve the 
social, economic and political security issues facing the vast majority of both 
Kuwaitis and Iraqis. The war’s impact worsened conditions for millions of 
people, particularly children and women who were left homeless and without 
medical care, proper sanitation, or adequate food and water resources. From 
this perspective the short- and long-term costs of war were unacceptably high. 
This can be contrasted to the economic sanctions imposed against apartheid
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South Africa, where it can be argued that the short-term costs of sanctions, as 
supported by the resistance movement in South Africa, outweighed the long-term 
gains of dismantling apartheid.
In Somalia, traditional security sees the failure as caused by the wrong 
conditions and improper use of military force to establish a peace agreement.
But from a global-human security perspective the failure involves the UN not 
protecting people from the warlords and in taking sides in a military dispute.
"With no clear guidelines for disarming the militias, I felt that the UN was 
affording the warlords time to amass more armaments...” (Farah 1995, 13). But 
more importantly, the failure occurred during the ten years leading up to the 
collapse of Somalia’s economy and infrastructure. The massive armaments 
trade in the region was a direct result of the Cold W ar divide and an international 
economic system based on military profit. The collapse of Somalia’s economy is 
due in part to over-arming but, as well, it is due to the legacies of colonialism and 
the imposition of ‘unfair’ and ‘corrupt’ western institutions (Abdi Ahmed Osman in 
UNCTAD 1991).
Preventive Diplomacy and Peacemaking Assessments
It is no wonder that Boutros-Ghali in his Supplement to An Agenda For
Peace (1995) stated that the greatest obstacle to preventive diplomacy and 
peacemaking ‘‘is not, as is widely supposed, lack of information, analytical 
capacity or ideas for United Nations initiatives. Success is often blocked at the
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outset by the reluctance of one or other of the parties to accept United Nations’ 
help" (Boutros-Ghali 1995). In the traditional security paradigm, which is by far 
the dominant perspective among state leaders, the sovereignty of the state is 
essential to security. A breach of sovereignty is perceived to be a breach of 
security. Thus, full scale peacemaking and preventive diplomacy actions would 
constitute an erosion of the state, therefore from the traditional security paradigm 
approach these options are restricted.
By contrast, this reaction helps explain why states frequently do not 
accept the jurisdiction of the World Court, which could be an important tool for 
conflict resolution or peacemaking. As long as intervening countries perceive it 
to be their legitimate right to use force in international and even domestic affairs, 
both preventive diplomacy and peacemaking will have little impact unless the 
country in conflict is willing to give up some of its perceived sovereign power.
Preventive diplomacy is one of many types of prevention methods 
advocated by adherents of the global-human security paradigm. Since, from this 
perspective, the very threats to security are social, economic, political, 
environmental and even militarism itself, the methods needed for preventing 
armed conflict are far-ranging: from confidence-building measures to actual 
disarmament programs, to making formal agreements not to accept violence in 
the first place (Tansey 1995). From this perspective, state sovereignty Is of 
secondary importance to the security of people and the protection of the earth.
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Thus the World Court, other supra-national bodies, or non-government 
organizations are useful and needed tools in arbitrating conflicts and relieving 
the underlying conditions that may lead to hostilities. From this perspective 
preventive diplomacy is a step in the right direction but insufficient by itself.
While peacemaking is necessary for stopping conflict, it comes too late as a 
durable solution.
Thus preventive diplomacy and peacemaking as defined above are 
essential tools but they must be part of a more radical and elaborate change in 
the international system. Preventive diplomacy and peacemaking are based on 
the traditional (realist) paradigm which is geared to preventing armed conflict or 
ameliorating the impact of armed conflict. The global-human security paradigm, 
as outlined in part one, asserts that security is not just about armed conflict or 
even politics. Security has ecological, economic, social and political dimensions 
which must be addressed in a holistic manner. Thus preventive diplomacy and 
peacemaking can only set the foundations for building a lasting and durable 
peace based on equality, justice and sustainability. Thus we are lead toward a 
process that must be sustainable and address the essential causes of conflict as 
outlined in part one.
Peacebuilding Assessment
Like other preventive measures, peacebuilding requires that a country be
willing to enable outside personnel and organizations to intervene in what are
Peter Coombes Peacetimes or Wartimes Page 96
traditionally internal matters. Typically, this causes great concern among nation 
states which are very protective of their sovereignty. That is why such actions 
are easier for the UN following a conflict when it may already have a foot in the 
door (Boutros-Ghali 1995). Besides the concern for national sovereignty, there 
is a common concern that the international system and the UN are not equipped 
to handle such large actions. “Peacebuilding, however, implies removing the 
causes of social tension. In the worst cases, such as Somalia, Rwanda, and 
(probably) Afghanistan, it may mean a form of internationai trusteeship..." 
(Pearson in Black 1995, 175).
Peacebuilding is the mainstay of the concept of global-human security. 
From the perspective of this paradigm, peacebuilding must be a continuous 
process that enhances a development and peace process, see figure 4 below. 
Nations and the international community must always be doing peacebuilding in 
order to prevent violent conflict, and following hostilities it is the only viable 
means to break the vicioi s cycle of war. Ir tiddition peacebuilding is about 
improving people's socio-economic well-being to ensure security at all levels —  
personal, community and global. The peacekeeping/peacebuilding mission in 
Cambodia is an excellent example of a comprehensive program that must be 
undertaken to break the cycle of war and violence. This mission has a multi­
functional range of projects, including; disarmament, demining, elections 
monitoring, development aid, and rebuilding political and economic 
infrastructures. There is also a wide-range of actors involved including: military
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peacekeepers, international police, the UN and its related development 
organizations, aid agencies from other states, and international non­
governmental organizations of all sorts. Cambodia may yet become a model not 
only for post conflict reconstruction but also for conflict prevention.
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The policy implications of an approach that is based on global-human 
security are vast and far-reaching for Third World states, for the North, and for 
global governance structures. The list of policies includes: demilitarization and 
disarmament, confidence-building, formal international agreements renouncing 
violence, protecting the environment, and building a socially responsible society
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that protects people’s rights, provides for basic human needs and is equitable 
and sustainable. Eric Tollefson (in Jacobsen 1994) outlines some of the 
elements necessary to create a more secure world. He includes massive job 
creation, health care, clean water and sanitation, eliminating famine and 
homelessness, wiping out illiteracy, referenda on contentious political issues, 
making Third World debt manageable, energy utilization efficiency, planting 
trees, and research and development for renewable energy sources. The list 
goes on. But underlying these policies is the assumption that people need to be 
in control of political and economic institutions at the local, state, regional and 
global level. Structures that include political and economic democracy are 
essential. A civil society that promotes the interest of the vast majority of people 
is in the best position to forward such policies at the state, regional and global 
level.
Peacebuilding is perceived from the vantage point of the traditional 
security perspective as a fine and noble objective but not one that is highly 
embraced. It is considered to be most useful in cases where the state has failed 
to fulfill its obligations, such that the international community must step in. It is 
then perceived as a transitional policy. From a global-human security paradigm 
there is a sense that peacebuilding is a required and perpetual policy need. 
Peacebuilding, essentially, is an integral and necessary aspect of any equitable 
sustainable development process.
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Paul Rogers, of the World Development Movement, suggests five overall 
responses to the core problems of poverty, environmental constraint and 
militarization. These five proposals are part of an elaborate political and 
economic program that many would consider necessary to respond to global- 
human security needs.
1. Processes of militarization have to be reversed.
2. Northern industrialized countries have radically to change their 
policies toward the South.
3. Development policies [...] must be in a form which will ensure 
accelerated yet environmentally sustainable development.
4. Future development in the industrialized countries must itself be 
sustainable...
5. There must be a change in international behaviour to ensure a 
rapid and effective response to any future changes in the global 
ecosystem (Rogers in Tansey 1993, 22).
The alternative is to keep on the same track —  militarism —  which is almost 
certain to be counterproductive (Tansey 1993; Jacobsen 1994). As a long-term 
process, peacebuilding must work toward broad development and peace goals 
as outlined above by Rogers. These policies essentially counter the global 
insecurities created by multi-national corporations, structural adjustment 
programs, and militarism as outlined in chapter four.
The following chapter briefly describes some of the policies needed to 
ensure that peacebuilding is more than a one time action and is integrated into a 
long-term development and peace process. As is already evident, the policies
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required go well beyond peacekeeping and even peacebuilding. They are broad 
political and economic development policies and constitute part of a process of 
demilitarization.
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion: Policies Beyond Peacekeeping
\'i':tu\ noiiitcü culture and economics are in a transitional phase. The 
' ■ f v-r-. of fr;iirjit»ofial Security is not only no longer valid, but the actual tools of 
security, mainly militarism and war, are not capable of handling the 
nf problems faced by the global community (if they ever were capable of 
with socio-economic security issues).
The list includes measures against terrorism and the narcotics 
industry, regulation of the arms trade, including control of chemical 
and biological weapons; efforts against global health problems 
such as polio and HIV/AIDS; and environmental issues ranging 
from global warming and marine resource and river management to 
the allocation of slots for satellite (Carlsson 1995, 5).
Furthermore, this list does not include the many problems such as migration and 
refugees, homelessness, starvation and poverty —  with the addition that new 
global problems arise each day. The traditional paradigm does not perceive 
these socio-economic issues as valid security concerns unless they impact upon 
the state and its ruling elite. The only tools required for ‘security’ were war or the 
preparation for war against external or internal enemies. It should be no 
surprise, then, that a new perspective on security is developing along with new 
challenges and tools.
Peacekeeping was a tool developed for traditional bipolar military security 
politics. United Nations peacekeeping was first used during the Cold War, well 
before globalization impacted upon security, causing a paradigmatic shift. As
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our security needs change so does the conception and implementation of 
peacekeeping expand to include other broader policy alternatives such as 
peacebuilding and sustainable development. This thesis has attempted to 
assess these general policy alternatives in terms of the changing nature of 
security.
After having demonstrated that a paradigmatic shift is occurring in the 
area of security to encompass human and global security needs, and after 
having evaluated the various forms of generic 'peacekeeping', it is evident that 
specific policy alternatives are necessary for the new security era. The following 
broad policy implications of a global and human security system are, and will 
continue to become, more prominent in state and global governance decision 
making processes.
The objective conditions of insecurity make it virtually impossible for the 
traditional paradigm to find lasting solutions to problems that it does not even 
recognize. This thesis has attempted to demonstrate that the traditional 
paradigm can only react by rearranging the military system —  a new hegemonic 
power, a new balance-of-power, a United Nation's army, or a collective security 
arrangement. These are variations of an old theme. The only way to find 
solutions to the 'real' security problems facing the world is by discarding the war 
system, militarism, and state-centred analysis. The first step is to recognize the 
problems —  poverty, ecological collapse, militarism, and the myriad of problems
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associated with these. The second step is toward dismantling the military 
system. The third step is toward rebuilding a political and economic system that 
addresses the underlying causes of armed conflict and structural-violence.
Disarmament
From the perspective of the global-human security paradigm, general and 
complete disarmament, as a long-term goal, is essential for several reasons. 
First, disarming nations builds a stronger sense of security since military threats 
are reduced. Second, disarming nuclear weapons protects the world from 
complete annihilation. Third, disarmament frees up money, resources and 
people to be used to build a sustainable economy. Fourth, converting to a 
civilian economy is more economically productive and better for the environment. 
And fifth, disarming insurgents and drug lords helps to protect individuals and 
communities from direct violence.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty symbolizes for many Third World 
states the dual standard imposed on the present global security system by the 
five major powers —  the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France and 
China. While the treaty enables these countries to build and maintain their 
nuclear arsenals, which are a threat to all states, it imposes strict conditions on 
the availability of nuclear weapons and their components to non-nuclear 
weapons states. Moreover, the non-nuclear weapons states have accepted the
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terms in the agreement while the nuclear states have not lived up to their end of 
the agreement, which is progress toward general and complete disarmament.
As long as nuclear weapons exist they remain a global threat. This threat 
has galvanized world support for nuclear disarmament over the past two 
decades. Today for example, the World Court Project is a global grassroots 
movement, led by international non-government organizations, attempting to get 
the World Court to declare nuclear weapons illegal. Since they have the support 
of the non-aligned states they have been successful in having the issue brought 
to the Court. As long as people world-wide feel threatened by nuclear weapons 
they will use their power in civil society to rid the world of them, Traditional 
security thinking, in particular the realist and neo-realist perspectives, 
underestimates the global power of people and their movements.
As threatening as nuclear weapons may be to our very survival, the reality 
is that most armed conflicts are being fought with small weapons, as outlined in 
chapter three. It is no coincidence that the majority of armed conflicts are being 
waged in the poorer regions of the world. Poverty exacerbates and is one of the 
prime causes of violence. Fueling these disputes and inequities with 
conventional weapons, mainly by the five permanent powers of the UN Security 
Council, further exacerbates the problem of development and social justice. 
Resources are squandered on weapons and in turn those same weapons are 
used to maintain the inequalities and disparities which are the cause of conflict in
Peter Coombes Peacetimes or Wartimes Page 105
the first place. Conventional disarmament must make massive strides forward if 
we are to prevent and ease conflicts such as Somalia and Yugoslavia. Or, if we 
are to prevent genocide as in Rwanda we must reduce and eventually rid the 
world of military assault rifles which enabled the massacre of tens-of-thousands 
of Rwandans within days. And conventional and nuclear disarmament must 
make massive strides forward if we are to rebuild productive economies which 
are geared to full employment.
Development
The underlying cause of much conflict and violence is directly due to the 
absolute poverty and growing economic disparities between people and between 
nation states. Social and political oppression are the basic causes of conflict. 
Evidence shows that the gulf between rich and poor is growing.
World inequality has also reached new dimensions: In 1989 the 
ratio differential in percapita income between the richest 20 per 
cent of countries and the poorest 20 per cent stood at 65 to 1, and 
at 140 to 1 between the richest 20 per cent of people and the 
poorest 20 per cent. Capitalist ‘development’ has ensured that one 
billion of the world’s people live in absolute poverty. More than 15 
million children die each year from poverty (Guy Arnold & Paul 
Elins in Petras & Polychroniou 1995, PE-38).
Structural adjustment programs —  cutting social programs in favour of promoting 
a ‘free’ market economy —  of the World Bank and IMF demonstrate that 
inequalities do foster violence. It comes as no surprise that often those countries 
where World Bank/IMF austerity measures are touted as most successful are
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authoritarian regimes —  Peru under President Fujimori, Ghana under Rawlings, 
and Chile under Pinochet.
The first priority of any government system must be the economic and 
political well-being of its citizens. The creation of an environmentally sustainable 
and equitable economy is the most important step toward creating global and 
human security for the long haul. Without human development there will not be 
stable global-human security.
In chapter four, it was asserted that the global capitalist system 
perpetuates economic insecurity. Thus a global systemic change is necessary to 
help build the foundations for a more secure world. This is not simply a utopian 
dream. The reality is that as long as the present growth model continues our 
global ecology is threatened. It has been said over and over that it is unrealistic 
to believe that we can continue the capitalist mode of growth unfettered. It is 
also unrealistic to believe that two-thirds of the world’s population will remain 
content as economic, social and political disparities grow. This disparity is one of 
the foremost sources of present day conflict, which will inevitably grow as do 
poverty and oppression. The Third World will not remain content paying 
usurious interest rates to the richest states and their corporations. And, the 
middle and lower classes of the developed world will not remain content 
transferring wealth to the rich. As long as these disparities exist conflict will arise 
as in Chiapas, Mexico and Oka, Quebec.
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A development process based on fairness and equality is essential. It will 
require addressing the power of multi-national corporations (MNCs), global 
governing institutions and the global political/economic elite. These powers can 
be addressed by: democratizing international institutions (for example, enlarging 
the UN Security Council to include African, Latin American, South East Asian 
and Middle Eastern States and abolishing the veto); democratizing the 
economies of nation states and global financial institutions; taking more control 
of MNCs; and, by directly involving the world’s population in processes of 
political and economic decision making at national, regional and global levels.
Confidence-Building Measures
To help prevent war and conflict between states and within states,
measures must be taken to demonstrate to other states or to opposing forces 
within a state that the political will is present to help resolve conflicts in a non­
violent way. Thus, as conflict arises measures can be taken to reduce the 
conflict to aid negotiations. Measures can also be taken to detect and attempt to 
foresee conflict before it happens or worsens, for example using the Good 
Offices of the Secretary General for early warning analysis and detection. Yet 
more importantly long-term measures can be taken to prevent conflict in the first 
place including M r  trade agreements, security agreements, cultural exchanges 
and similarly negotiated agreements.
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As state sovereignty continues to be eroded it will become more important 
that regional and global confidence-building measures be undertaken by 
individual nation states, by a democratic United Nations, and by non-government 
organizations. Such measures will provide the foundation for trust and building 
the political will needed for implementing regional and global disarmament and 
development policies.
In order to prevent the out-break of violence or war it is essential that all 
measures of diplomacy be exhausted by the parties involved directly and by 
outside forces. W ar is not the continuation of politics or ‘diplomacy by other 
means’. Rather, war is the failure of politics and the failure of diplomacy.
Perpetual Peacebuilding
With the decline of the nation state and with the globalization of security
as outlined above, a new form of governing mechanism must be established to 
ensure global security. The present global governance bodies —  for example 
the UN, the World Bank, the IMF. NAFTA, and World Trade Organization, among 
others —  are dominated and controlled by the Western world in general, in 
particular by the United States, and their corporate institutions. But, these 
institutions are not able, and will not be able, to provide the necessary leadership 
for a global-human security as long as they are dominated by the west —  the 
western triad: the United States, Germany and Japan, Global democratic 
‘revolution’ is necessary. Tinkering with these bodies will not be enough as long
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as two-thirds of the world’s population (mostly the Third World) remains isolated 
from the decision-making of these international bodies. Democratizing political 
and economic institutions is a prerequisite to developing a true security system. 
The pressure for such change will ultimately come from civil society as various 
interests competing for more power converge.
A one time peacekeeping mission, the monitoring of elections, the 
rebuilding of an economy after war, de-mining, humanitarian aid, and preventive 
diplomacy are all necessary components of building and keeping peace, but they 
are not enough. The Agenda for Peace proposes all of these as important tools 
for building a peace but they are presented as fragmented and separate items, 
within a hierarchical military system. The building and keeping of peace requires 
a holistic and perpetual program at all levels of society, from teaching our 
children the merits of resolving conflicts peacefully to building economies that are 
ecologically sustainable and based on equality.
Concluding remarks
Peacekeeping, peacemaking, preventative diplomacy and peacebuilding
remain essential in creating security that is people-centred. But they are most 
useful when implemented within a global-human security paradigm; that is, if 
they work within an ideological system that is moving toward undermining the 
belief that war and violence are legitimate means of resolving international
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disputes and that economic, social and political disparities are problems that 
must be addressed.
If followed to its logical conclusion, The Agenda for Peace could 
become an agenda for war, entangling the United Nations and the 
United States in a series of ‘savage wars of peace’ around the 
globe (Sokolsky 1995, 274).
Using the definitions of security outlined above, the risk of the UN becoming 
involved in warmaking continues as long as it adheres to reports such as An 
Agenda For Peace which continues to operate in the traditional security mold —  
a perspective which accepts that international violence and war Is a legitimate 
means to resolving disputes, including collective security. Once it is recognized 
that international violence, war and militarism are part of the problem, the 
methods of how to resolve and prevent violence can be changed. The Agenda 
for Peace has many redeeming points. But if it is to succeed in preventing 
conflict it must recognize that peacekeeping, peacemaking and preventive 
diplomacy have to be presented and developed as non-violent policy tools.
The global-human security paradigm is both an ideal and an objective 
reality. It is an ideal in that it prescribes radical policy alternatives as outlined, 
and holds fast to the ethical and moral belief that security only has meaning and 
purpose when it is people-centred. It is an objective reality in that global 
capitalism and militarism are devastating the global ecology and the economic 
well-being of the vast majority of people.
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As mentioned earlier in this thesis, there are both immutable and 
changeable forces. The negative impact global capitalism and militarism have 
on human security needs is an immutable relationship. Thus, and this is the 
great challenge, it is necessary to get rid of both global capitalism and global 
militarism. There are signs of hope that both militarism and global capitalism are 
being challenged. Such mammoth change does not occur overnight or within a 
couple of decades. It takes many decades, even centuries. It is both historically 
determined and consciously chosen. In chapter four, a brief review of global 
security trends shed some light on the possibility of positive change that may be 
occurring. It is the dialectical relationship between peoples’ subjective desire for 
social, economic, ecological and political security, and the objective reality that 
the present state system is suppressing those needs —  even creating the 
problems of insecurity —  that sets the stage for historical change.
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